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1 Introduction
An	approach	to	explaining	the	nature	and	source	of	logic	and	its	laws	
with	 a	 rich	 historical	 tradition	 takes	 the	 laws	 of	 logic	 to	 be	 laws	 of	
thought.	 Such	 an	 approach	 can	be	 found	 in	Kant’s	work,	 particular-
ly	Kant’s	 lectures	on	logic	and	his	Critique of Pure Reason	 (Kant,	1992,	
1998),	and	in	the	work	of	Boole	and	Frege.	In	the	case	of	Boole	(1854),	
the	clue	is	in	the	title	of	his	book:	An Investigation of The Laws of Thought 
on Which are Founded the Mathematical Theories of Logic and Probabilities.	
MacFarlane	(2002)	presents	an	interpretation	of	Frege’s	views	on	logi-
cal	laws,	whereby	they	are	not	straightforwardly	laws	of	thought,	but	
give	rise	to	such	laws.	Both	Kant	and	Frege	placed	themselves	in	oppo-
sition	to	psychologistic	logicians	who	took	logic	to	be	a	matter	of	how	
we	actually	think.	They	were	interested	not	in	how	we	actually	reason,	
but	in	how	we	ought	to	reason.
In	logic	we	do	not	want	to	know	how	the	understanding	
is	and	does	think	and	how	it	has	previously	proceeded	in	
thought,	but	rather	how it ought to proceed in thought.	(9:14,	
Kant,	1992:	529,	my	emphasis)
The	[laws	of	logic]	have	a	special	title	to	the	name	“laws	
of	 thought”	only	 if	we	mean	 to	assert	 that	 they	are	 the	
most	general	laws,	which	prescribe	universally	the way in 
which one ought to think if one is to think at all.	(Frege	1893,	
xv,	translation	by	Textor	2011,	20–21,	my	emphasis)
The	view	that	laws	of	logic	are	laws	of	thought	seems	intuitively	com-
pelling;	 after	 all,	 logic	 seems	 to	 be	 intimately	 related	with	 how	we	
think.	But	how	exactly	 should	we	understand	 this	 claim?	And	what	
argument	can	we	give	in	favour	of	it?	The	aim	of	this	paper	is	to	pro-
pose	one	line	of	argument	for	the	claim	that	the	laws	of	logic	are	laws	
of	thought.	First,	I	will	clarify	what	this	claim	amounts	to,	i. e.,	whether	
the	claim	concerns	laws	as	normative	or	constitutive.	Then,	I	will	mo-
tivate	the	claim	that	there	is	a	certain	phenomenon,	namely	that	there	
are	 logical	principles	which	are	 immune	to	rational	doubt.	This	will	
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inference,	 they	will	not	count	as	 inferring.	They	tried	to	perform	an	
inference,	but	did	not	succeed.	Rules	of	inference	tell	us	what	we	can	
infer:	e. g.,	from	P	and	P	⊃	Q,	one	may	infer	Q.	Of	course,	if	we	choose	
to	 follow	a	different	rule,	and	conclude	P	&	(P	⊃	Q)	 from	the	same	
premises,	we	are	not	violating	modus ponens,	but	following	&-introduc-
tion.	But	if	no	valid	rule	of	inference	is	followed,	then	on	a	constitutive	
understanding,	no	inference	has	taken	place.
By	contrast,	normative principles	tell	us	only	how	things	ought to be, 
or	what	we	ought to do,	even	if	they	actually	fail	to	be	so,	or	we	fail	to	
do	so.	Normative	laws	for	Fs	function	to	separate	the	good	Fs	from	the	
bad,	the	correct	from	the	incorrect.	These	kinds	of	laws	tell	us	what	is	
permissible	and	not	permissible	for	Fs.	E. g.,	 if	we	take	rules	of	infer-
ence	to	be	normative	laws,	the	rule	modus ponens	will	tell	us	something	
about	correct	inference.	On	this	construal	of	laws,	if	someone	attempts	
to	do	some	reasoning	following	no	valid	rules	of	inference,	they	may	
still	count	as	inferring,	but	as	inferring	badly.
Finally,	a	constitutive-normative law	also	functions	to	separate	the	Fs	
from	the	non-Fs,	not	in	terms	of	whether	or	not	something	conforms	
to	the	law,	but	in	terms	of	whether	something	is	subject to	or	evaluable 
in light of	 the	 law.	So,	 if	 rules	of	 inference	were	 to	be	understood	 in	
this	way,	in	order	to	count	as	inferring,	one’s	activity	must	be	subject	
to	—	i. e.,	count	as	right	or	wrong	in	light	of	—	those	rules	of	inference.	
If	one	were	to	reason	without	following	any	valid	rule	of	inference,	but	
that	didn’t	count	as	getting	something	wrong,	or	if	one	were	to	reason	
in	accordance	with	a	valid	rule,	but	that	didn’t	count	as	getting	some-
thing	right,	then	one	wouldn’t	count	as	inferring.
In	 light	 of	 this	 threefold	 distinction,	 how	 should	we	 understand	
“laws”	in	the	claim	that	laws	of	logic	are	laws	of	thought:	as	constitu-
tive,	normative,	or	constitutive-normative?
2.1 Constitutive Laws
If	the	laws	of	thought	are	understood	constitutively,	then	they	tell	us	
what	does	and	does	not	count	as	thinking.	If	the	laws	of	logic	are	con-
stitutive	laws	of	thought,	then	mental	activity	which	conforms	to	the	
involve	drawing	together	work	from	several	sources	to	present	an	over-
all	case.	So	whilst	much	of	the	paper	may	appear	to	present	the	views	of	
others,	the	intended	contribution	is	to	show	how	this	work	can	be	col-
lected	into	a	single	line	of	thought,	proposed	here.	The	heart	of	the	pa-
per	will	then	be	an	argument	to	the	best	explanation;	I	will	argue	that	
the	best	explanation	of	this	phenomenon	is	to	take	the	laws	of	 logic	
to	be	constitutive-normative	laws	of	thought.	My	proposal,	and	some	
responses	to	potential	objections,	will	have	a	notably	Kantian	flavour.
2 Laws of Thought
Before	considering	what	a	 law	of	 thought	might	be,	 I	 should	clarify	
what	I	will	mean	by	‘thought’.	I	have	in	mind	a	conception	which	in-
cludes	something	as	minimal	as	‘entertaining	a	proposition’,	as	well	as	
more	 robust	 thoughts	 such	as	 ‘opining	 that	p’,	beliefs,	propositional	
knowledge,	drawing	inferences,	and	so	on.	The	core	idea	is	that	some	
propositional	 content	 should	 be	 involved.	 So,	 for	 example,	 cases	
which	are	not	obviously	propositional,	e. g.,	cases	of	mental	 imagery,	
or	trying	to	remember	a	melody,	will	count	as	cases	of	thinking	in	my	
sense	 only	 if	 they	 are	 accompanied	 by	 some	 propositional	 content.	
This	isn’t	a	very	demanding	condition;	e. g.,	in	trying	to	imagine	a	sce-
nario,	I	may	often	have	a	description	in	mind	to	guide	my	imagining,	
which	is	propositional	in	form.	If	the	reader	nevertheless	takes	this	to	
be	too	strong	a	condition,	then	the	present	discussion	should	be	read	
as	being	about	laws	of	propositional	thought.	I	take	it	that	this	is	still	
a	sufficiently	wide-ranging	phenomenon	to	render	the	laws	of	such	a	
phenomenon	philosophically	interesting.
There	 are	 three	 crucially	 different	ways	 one	might	 understand	 a	
candidate	 law:	 constitutive, normative,	 or	 constitutive-normative.	A	 con-
stitutive law	tells	us	about	the	nature	of	a	thing.	Constitutive	laws	for	Fs	
function	to	separate	the	Fs	from	the	non-Fs.	These	kinds	of	laws	tell	us	
what	is	and	is	not	possible	for	Fs.	E. g.,	consider	the	view	that	rules	of	
inference	are	constitutive	laws	in	this	sense.	So	the	rule	modus ponens 
will	tell	us	something	about	the	nature	of	 inference	(or	implication).	
If	someone	reasons	incorrectly,	and	does	not	conform	to	any	rule	of	
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Second,	one	might	argue	that	if	I	can	perfectly	well	think	that	p,	and	
I	can	perfectly	well	 think	that	¬p,	why	should	thinking	them	in	suffi-
ciently	close	proximity	prevent	me	from	being	able	to	think	either	one?
More	seriously,	one	might	ask,	if	we	can’t	think	a	proposition,	how	
can	we	know	that	it	is	a	contradictory	proposition?	Similarly,	it	is	often	
claimed	that	contradictions	are	false.	But	how	can	we	determine	that	
a	proposition	is	false	if	it	cannot	be	thought?	Can	we	even	make	sense	
of	there	being	a	proposition	at	all?
Perhaps	we	could	take	not	being	able	to	think	the	proposition	as	
evidence	for	it	being	contradictory.	However,	it	might	be	illogical	for	
other	reasons,	or	it	might	not	be	a	well-formed	proposition.	So	such	
evidence	 is	 inconclusive.	 Alternatively,	 one	 might	 introduce	 a	 dis-
tinction	between	a	genuinely	 contradictory	 thought,	 that p&¬p,	 and	
a	 thought	about	a	 contradiction,	 that the proposition that p&¬p is con-
tradictory.1 One	might	agree	that	the	first	is	literally	unthinkable,	but	
that	the	latter	is	not	ruled	out	by	the	laws	of	logic,	and	hence	allows	us	
to	recognize	cases	where	the	unthinkability	of	a	proposition	is	due	to	
its	being	a	contradiction.	If	this	latter,	thinkable	kind	of	proposition	is	
also	all	that	is	required	to	assess	and	correct	logical	mistakes,	then	the	
previous	point	about	correcting	mistakes	would	also	 fail.	We	would	
not	need	to	be	able	to	directly	think	contradictions	in	order	to	recog-
nize	contradiction,	nor	to	correct	it.
However,	 the	problem	with	this	proposal	 is	 that	 it	still	 isn’t	clear	
how	 the	 thought	 that the proposition that p&¬p is contradictory	 could	
interact	appropriately,	as	part	of	a	 rational	process,	with	a	mistaken	
pseudo-thought	 that	 p&¬p,	 if	 the	 latter	 is	 not	 a	 thought,	 but	 some-
thing	else.	If	I	do	something	with	the	content	p&¬p,	and	if	that	isn’t	a	
thought,	then	it	isn’t	subject	to	the	laws	of	thought.	So	what	if	I	also	
think	that	the	proposition	that	p&¬p	is	contradictory?	The	laws	gov-
erning	my	thinking	might	well	require,	in	the	light	of	this	thought,	that	
I	reject	any	thought	of	the	form	p&¬p.	But	according	to	the	constitu-
tive	account,	if	I	make	this	kind	of	mistake,	there	is	no	thought	to	be	
1.	 Thank	you	to	an	anonymous	referee	for	raising	this	point.	
laws	of	 logic	may	count	as	 thinking,	but	mental	activity	which	does	
not	conform	to	any	law	of	logic	could	not	count	as	thought.	Therefore,	
we	 should	be	unable	 to	 think	 illogically.	 This	 view	 is	 committed	 to	
our	being	utterly	unable,	not	merely	not	permitted,	to	think	illogically.	
This	is	just	false.	We	think	illogically	all	the	time:	we	make	mistakes	in	
inference	and	reasoning,	we	hold	contradictory	beliefs,	we	find	falla-
cies	convincing,	and	so	on.	The	constitutivist	may	reply	that	when	we	
make	such	mistakes,	we	in	fact	do	not	count	as	thinking;	there	is	the	
mere	illusion	of	thought	and	reasoning,	but	we	are	in	fact	engaging	in	
some	distinct	mental	activity.	However,	this	kind	of	response	cannot	
be	maintained.
First,	we	are	often	able	to	recognise	our	logical	mistakes,	either	by	
ourselves	or	through	the	help	of	others,	and	go	on	to	correct	ourselves	
in	a	reasonable	way.	Suppose	someone	makes	a	logical	error,	but	is	cor-
rected.	It	is	plausible	to	assume	that	reasonable	thinkers	are	capable	of	
recognising	where	they	went	wrong	and	adjusting	their	reasoning	ac-
cordingly.	However,	if	what	one	does	when	one	makes	a	logical	error	
isn’t	even	thought,	how	is	it	that	one	is	able	to	rationally	reflect	on	what	
one	is	doing,	and	relate	it	in	a	suitable	way	to	genuine,	logically	correct	
thoughts,	in	order	to	correct	mistakes	and	transform	one’s	activity	into	
correct	inference?	I	contend	that	it	doesn’t	make	sense	to	characterize	
such	cases	in	terms	of	two	different	kinds	of	mental	activity,	thought	
and	something	else.	Rather,	this	is	simply	a	case	of	mistaken	thought	
and	inference,	followed	by	corrected	thought	and	inference.
The	point	can	be	made	in	relation	to	one	particular	candidate	law	
of	thought	(logic),	the	law	of	non-contradiction.	Understood	as	a	con-
stitutive	law	of	thought,	this	is	supposed	to	represent	how	we	in	fact	
always	think,	i. e.,	that	no	thought	is	contradictory	(of	the	form	p&¬p).	
Any	purported	 instance	of	 a	 thought	 that	p&¬p	will	 violate	 the	 law,	
and	hence	should	not	count	as	 thinking.	The	 implication	 is	 that	we	
cannot	even	entertain	propositions	with	such	a	contradictory	content,	
but	we	can.
First,	 one	 might	 appeal	 to	 anecdotal	 or	 introspective	 evidence:	
Doesn’t	Graham	Priest	 think	several	contradictions	before	breakfast?	
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However,	the	story	does	not	end	there.	One	can	always	ask:	Why 
does	something	provide	reasons	for	something	else?	And	there	are	dif-
ferent	answers	to	this	question.	There	are	a	number	of	different	ways	
something	might	be	normative.	Hanna	(2006,	section	7.1)	highlights	
some	helpful	distinctions.	In	particular,	the	normativity	of	something	
X	might	be	an	intrinsic	or	extrinsic feature	of	it.4 If	X	is	extrinsically	nor-
mative,	X	depends	 for	 its	normativity	on	something	else	external	 to	
it.	E. g.,	 logical	laws	might	be	intrinsically non-normative, e. g.,	a	purely	
descriptive	science	of	truth-bearers,	but	nevertheless	provide	norms	
when	considered	in	relation	to	other	interests	or	practices	(such	as	the	
need	to	preserve	truth	when	engaged	in	empirical	science).
How	 might	 it	 be	 that	 some	 principles	 are	 normative	 laws	 of	
thought?	 They	 might	 have	 extrinsic	 normativity,	 e. g.,	 if	 there	 were	
a	norm	directly	governing	 thought,	 to	aim	 for	 the	 truth,	and	 logical	
principles	served	that	aim	by	preserving	truth.	However,	this	kind	of	
extrinsic	 normativity	would	 render	 laws	 of	 logic	 normative	 laws	 of	
thought	only	insofar	as	there	are	more	fundamental	norms	of	thought.	
If	the	norms	directly	governing	thought	were	different,	e. g.,	if	thought	
were	to	aim	at	happiness	(even	at	the	price	of	self-delusion),	then	the	
laws	of	logic	might	not	provide	laws	for	how	we	ought	to	think	after	
all.	The	laws	of	logic,	by	this	view,	are	independent	of	thought.	So	if	
the	norms	directly	governing	thought	were	to	change,	the	laws	of	logic	
would	not.	They	would	merely	cease	to	be	relevant	to	our	thinking.	In	
exploring	the	prospects	of	a	 laws-of-thought	account	of	 logical	 laws,	
then,	this	kind	of	view	doesn’t	help.	We	are	left	needing	an	account	of	
the	intrinsic	nature	of	laws	of	logic,	apart	from	any	extrinsic	normative	
force	they	have	for	thought.
A	more	promising	approach	is	to	consider	the	laws	of	logic	as	more	
directly	connected	to	thought,	with	no	intermediary	norm.	The	laws	of	
standards	or	prescriptions,	and	not	make	any	claims	regarding	the	value	of,	
e. g.,	thinking	logically.	
4.	 How	 exactly	 we	 should	 understand	 the	 intrinsic/extrinsic	 distinction	 is	 a	
thorny	 issue,	but	 the	 rough	 idea	 that	 intrinsic	 features	are	 to	do	with	how	
something	is	“on	its	own”,	and	extrinsic	features	to	do	with	how	other	things	
are,	should	suffice	for	present	purposes.
corrected.	I’m	left	with	my	mistaken	pseudo-thought,	and	no	logical	
means	to	reject	it.	It	may	be	that	the	thought	that the proposition that 
p&¬p is contradictory	can	interact	with	my	mistake	in	other	ways:	for	
example,	there	might	be	a	causal	link	between	this	thought	and	the	
subsequent	 loss	 of	 the	 contradictory	 pseudo-thought.	 But	 anything	
other	 than	 a	 logical	 relation	 between	 thoughts	 isn’t	 going	 to	 count	
as	a	rational,	logical	process	of	correction.	It	seems	plausible	that	we	
should	be	able	 to	correct	our	 logical	mistakes	 rationally and logically, 
not	due	to	other,	perhaps	merely	causal,	processes.	Hence	we	face	the	
problem	again,	 that	 to	 account	 for	our	 rational	 recognition	and	 cor-
rection	of	logical	mistakes,	we	need	to	be	able	to	think	contradictions.
We	 should	 not	 claim	 that	 contradictions	 are	 unthinkable,	 in	 the	
sense	 that	 we	 are	 literally	 not	 able	 to	 think	 them.2 In	 short,	 under-
standing	 laws	of	 thought	 as	 constitutive	will	 not	 provide	 a	 suitable	
account	of	laws	of	logic	as	laws	of	thought,	because	we	break	the	laws	
of	logic	all	the	time	when	thinking.
2.2 Norms for Thought
The	broad	alternative	to	a	constitutive	reading	of	laws	of	thought	is	a	
normative	one.	A	“norm”	provides	a	rule,	or	a	standard,	or	a	prescrip-
tion	for	behaviour	or	action,	which	may	or	may	not	be	followed.	If	a	
norm	 is	not	 followed,	 this	 is	 accompanied	by	a	notion	of	 somehow	
being	 incorrect	 or	wrong	 or	 liable for punishment.	 Likewise,	 following	
a	norm	is	deemed	as	being	correct	or	right	or	perhaps	 liable for praise.	
Some	object	or	phenomenon	is	normative	if	it	provides	reasons,	stan-
dards,	 prescriptions,	 rules,	 etc.	 for	 what	 to	 do.	 A	 normative	 law	 of	
thought,	then,	will	provide	reasons,	obligations,	permissions	and	the	
like	to	think	in	certain	ways.	Note	that	these	laws	may	come	apart	from	
how	we	in	fact	think	and	reason:	we	may	often	fall	short	of	what	we	
ought	to	do.3
2.	 See	Priest	(1998a,b)	for	more	detailed	arguments	against	thinking	that	con-
tradictions	have	no	thinkable	propositional	content.
3.	 Sometimes	 normativity	 is	 also	 closely	 associated	 with	 value.	 In	 this	 pa-
per	I	will	use	only	the	sense	of	 ‘normativity’	which	implies	the	presence	of	
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[T]he	attempt	to	formulate	the	foundations	of	logic	is	ren-
dered	arduous	by	a	…	“logocentric”	predicament.	In	order	
to	give	an	account	of	logic,	we	must	presuppose	and	em-
ploy	logic.	(Sheffer,	1926:	228)
Such	a	predicament	is	to	be	understood	in	terms	of	justification.	Often,	
when	giving	a	justification	of	some	or	other	practice	or	rule,	we	will	
employ	logical	reasoning.	But	how	then	can	we	justify	the	validity	of	
logical	 rules?	 It	 doesn’t	 seem	 right	 to	use	 the	very	 thing	 to	be	 justi-
fied	in	its	justification,	and	so	it	doesn’t	seem	right	to	use	logical	prin-
ciples	to	justify	logical	principles.	But	then,	how	else	can	we	provide	a	
justification?	This	is	the	kind	of	logocentric	predicament	discussed	by	
Hanna	(2006).7
The	present	paper	can	be	understood	as	largely	inspired	by	Hanna’s	
treatment	of	 these	 issues,	but	as	taking	a	notably	different	direction.	
Opinion	is	split	regarding	whether	we	really	need	to	give	a	genuine	
justification	of	deductive	logical	rules.	For	example,	Dummett	offers	a	
distinction	between	suasive	and	explanatory	arguments.	A	suasive	ar-
gument	is	intended	to	persuade	someone,	already	believing	the	prem-
ises,	of	 the	truth	of	 the	conclusion.	 In	contrast,	an	explanatory	argu-
ment	seeks	to	explain	why	a	conclusion	is	true,	by	appeal	to	the	prem-
ises,	where	the	conclusion	is	already	known	or	taken	to	be	true	(see	
Dummett	[1973,	1978]).	Whilst	it	does	seem	illegitimate	to	use	a	rule	
in	an	argument	which	is	intended	to	persuade	someone	that	the	rule	
is	 valid	 (in	a	 suasive	argument),	nevertheless,	Dummett	 claims	 that	
there	is	no	problem	for	using	a	rule	in	an	argument	which	is	intended	
to	explain	why	the	rule	 is	valid	 to	someone	who	already	accepts	 its	
validity	(in	an	explanatory	argument)	(see	Dummett	[1973,	1978]).
One	may	rest	content	with	Dummett’s	retreat	to	explanatory	argu-
ments	for	justification	of	rules	of	deduction,	or	one	may	still	wonder	
what	 it	 is	 about	deduction	 that	 appears	 to	 rule	 out	 the	 kind	of	 sua-
sive	justificatory	argument	that	it	is	possible	to	give	in	so	many	other	
7.	 See	in	particular	Hanna	(2006:	54–55).
logic,	whatever	they	are,	directly	constitute	norms	for	how	we	ought	to	
think.5 Ultimately,	I	shall	argue	that	there	is	a	phenomenon	—	rational-
ly	indubitable	logical	principles	—	which	is	best	explained	if	the	laws	
of	logic	provide	constitutive-normative	laws	for	thought,	such	that	if	
one	is	not	subject	to	these	norms,	one	is	not	thinking.	This	should	also	
serve	to	rule	out	a	view	where	logical	laws	are	extrinsically	normative:	
this	would	require	that	there	be	an	external	element	determining	what	
constitutes	thought,	beyond	thought	itself.	Unless	one	wants	to	postu-
late	some	kind	of	God	decreeing	what	it	is	to	be	something,6 I	do	not	
see	what	such	an	external	element	could	be.
3 Logic and Rational Indubitability
3.1 A Logocentric Predicament?
Why	think	that	the	laws	of	logic	are	laws	of	thought?	The	strategy	of	
the	following	will	be	something	like	an	argument	to	the	best	explana-
tion.	 I	will	first	 argue	 that	 there	 are	principles	 that	 thinkers	 are	not	
able	to	rationally	doubt.	The	challenge	is	to	then	provide	an	explana-
tion	of	this	phenomenon.	I	will	argue	that	one	very	good	explanation	
is	that	the	laws	of	logic	are	constitutive-normative	laws	of	thought.	I	
will	contrast	this	with	other	views	of	laws	of	logic,	which	I	argue	can-
not	provide	a	satisfactory	explanation.	I	will	not	have	space	to	explore	
every	possible	explanation,	and	hence	I	can’t	quite	claim	that	my	“laws	
of	thought”	explanation	is	the	best,	but	I	will	conclude	that	it	is	at	least	
very good,	and	better than	the	others	I	discuss.
A	similar	phenomenon	in	the	vicinity	is	the	so-called	“logocentric	
predicament”,	the	circumstance	that	we	find	ourselves	in	when	we	try	
to	give	an	account	of	logic	but	are	bound	to	use	logic	in	doing	so.
5.	 There	are	two	ways	one	might	understand	‘we	ought	to	think	in	accordance	
with	the	laws	of	logic’.	Either	we ought to think in accordance with the laws, what-
ever they are,	where	the	laws	are	described	and	not	specified,	or	we ought to 
think in accordance with law L1, law L2, etc.,	where	the	laws	themselves	appear	
in	the	law	of	thought.	In	this	present	case,	I	mean	the	latter.	
6.	 Which	I	don’t.
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His	argument	is	based	on	the	idea	that,	if	part	of	what	it	is	to	under-
stand	 a	 logical	 constant	 is	 to	 accept	 certain	 principles	 of	 inference	
concerning	 that	 logical	constant,	 then	to	doubt	 these	principles	will	
amount	 to	 misunderstanding	 the	 logical	 constants.	 So	 there	 is	 no	
room	for	intelligent	or	rational	doubt	of	these	principles,	as	opposed	
to	just	missing	the	point.
The	fact	that	acceptance	of	(at	least	sufficiently	simple	in-
stances	of)	basic	patterns	of	inference	featuring	a	logical	
operator	is	(at	least	partly)	constitutive	of	understanding	
that	operator	has	an	 important	consequence	—	it	means	
that	 one	 cannot	 regard	 anything	which	 is	 recognisably	
an	instance	of	the	relevant	inference	pattern	as	unsound	
without	 convicting	 oneself	 of	 misunderstanding.	 (Hale,	
2002:	290)
First,	Hale	considers	cases	which	look	like	genuine	doubting	of	a	can-
didate	principle	by	a	suitably	 intelligent	person,	such	as	McGee’s	at-
tack	against	modus ponens.10	McGee’s	strategy	was	 to	give	counterex-
amples	to	the	rule;	however,	these	are	all	of	a	certain	complexity,	of	
the	following	general	form	(of	which	McGee	himself	is	aware).
If	ϕ,	then	if	ψ	then	θ;
ϕ;
Therefore,	if	ψ	then	θ.11
10.	 See	McGee	(1985).	See	Sinnott-Armstrong	et	al.	(1986),	Lowe	(1987)	and	Over	
(1987)	for	critical	responses.	
11.	 “Opinion	polls	 taken	 just	before	 the	 1980	election	showed	 the	Republican	
Ronald	Reagan	decisively	ahead	of	the	Democrat	Jimmy	Carter,	with	the	oth-
er	Republican	in	the	race,	John	Anderson,	a	distant	third.	Those	apprised	of	
the	poll	results	believed,	with	good	reason:	
	 	 	If	a	Republican	wins	the	election,	then	if	it’s	not	Reagan	who	wins	it	will	be	
Anderson.
	 	 A	Republican	will	win	the	election.	
	 	 Yet	they	did	not	have	reason	to	believe
circumstances.	But	rather	than	engage	with	this	controversy,	I	want	to	
focus	on	a	prior	“predicament”	—	one	not	of	justification,	but	of	doubt.	
The	claim	is	that	there	are	some	logical	principles	that do not admit of ra-
tional doubt,	or	if	they	do,	only	at	a	prohibitive	cost.8	There	is	an	impor-
tant	sense	in	which	one	cannot	properly	even	question	these	principles.	
This	is	a	striking	fact	about	our	ability	to	reason	and	question,	which	
demands	explanation.	Why	do	certain	principles	have	such	a	binding	
effect	on	our	thought?	Note	that	if	one	cannot	doubt	a	principle,	the	
task	of	justifying	it	seems	rather	premature.	If	we	cannot	even	coher-
ently	raise	doubts	about	the	validity	of	certain	principles,	how	can	the	
task	of	 (suasive)	 justification	of	 those	principles	even	get	going?	So	
the	rational	indubitability	of	logical	principles	may	be	able	to	account	
for	our	inability	to	properly	give	a	justification	of	them.	But	the	deeper	
predicament	is	the	rational	indubitability	of	a	principle,	not	the	seem-
ing	redundancy	of	a	justification	for	the	principle.	Why	do	logical	prin-
ciples,	and	seemingly	no	other	kinds	of	principle,	have	such	a	hold	on	
us?	Such	a	phenomenon	 invites	 consideration	and	explanation.	But	
before	I	can	answer	this	question,	I	must	first	motivate	my	claim	that	
we	are	indeed	in	such	a	predicament.
3.2 The Minimal Logical Toolkit
In	“Basic	Logical	Knowledge”,	Hale	argues	that	there	is	a	“minimal	tool-
kit”	of	logical	principles	that	are	involved	in	the	very	practices	of	doubt-
ing	and	reasoning	about	the	soundness	of	logical	principles.	Hence,	it	
makes	no	good	sense	to	doubt	the	soundness	of	these	principles.
The	main	target	of	Hale’s	paper	is	to	consider	“whether	there	is	any	
basic	 logical	knowledge	and	 if	 there	 is,	how	 this	 is	possible”	 (2002:	
280),9 but	he	also	addresses	a	related	issue:	that	of	“explaining	why it 
is not possible intelligently (i. e.,	clear-headedly	and	coherently)	to doubt 
the	soundness	of	basic	rules	such	as	[modus ponens]”	(Hale,	2002:	289).	
8.	 By	rational	doubt,	I	mean	to	rule	out	simply	stamping	one’s	foot	and	refusing	
to	trust	a	principle,	even	in	the	face	of	compelling	reasons	to	the	contrary.
9.	 Logical	knowledge	is	understood	as	knowledge	about	 logic,	not	knowledge	
arising	out	of	the	use	of	logic	(i. e.,	not	inferential	knowledge).
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raise	doubts	about	the	validity	of	other	rules	of	inference,	such	as	the	
tonk-rules,	which	arguably	are	also	constitutive	of	understanding	“bad”	
logical	operators,	such	as	tonk?12
If	one	can	argue:	acceptance	of	modus ponens	is	required	
for	understanding	the	conditional,	so	if	a	thinker	suppos-
es	she	can	envisage	a	counter-example	to	it	…	she	must	
be	confused,	then	one	can	just	as	well	argue:	acceptance	
of	 tonk-elimination	 is	 required	 for	understanding	 ‘tonk’,	
so	if	a	thinker	supposes	she	can	envisage	a	case	in	which	
it	would	be	true	that	A tonk B	but	not	true	that	B,	she	(too)	
must	be	confused.	But	 the	 tonk	rules	are	clearly	duff.	 It	
must,	therefore,	be	possible	to	entertain	doubts	—	indeed,	
well-founded	 doubts	—	about	 them.	 So	 there	 has	 to	 be	
something	wrong	with	the	argument	in	their	case.	Since	
the	argument	for	the	conditional	rules	runs	entirely	paral-
lel,	it	must	likewise	be	defective.	(Hale,	2002:	292)
What	makes	the	difference?	The	objection	is	based	on	the	idea	that	to	
doubt	the	validity	of	a	rule	of	inference	will	involve	envisaging	a	coun-
terexample	to	it.	In	order	to	side-step	this	worry,	one	need	only	show	
how	some	other	way	to	doubt	the	validity	of	a	rule	of	inference	is	ap-
propriate	in	the	case	of	tonk-rules,	but	not	in	the	case	of	rules	such	as	
modus ponens.	Hale	considers	what	might	be	involved	in	doubting	or	
questioning	the	validity	of	a	rule	of	inference.	He	takes	it	that	this	will	
involve	reasoning.	After	all,	 the	lack	of	conservativeness	of	the	“tonk”	
introduction	and	elimination	rules	is	hardly	something	one	can	see	at	
a	glance:	one	needs	to	think	about	it	and	do	some	reasoning	to	realize	
that.	Of	course,	one	might	 just	doubt	with	brute	 force,	but	 then	the	
doubt	will	 not	be	 rational	 or	 reasonable,	 but	 rather	 just	 a	mindless	
12. 
A A	tonk	B
A	tonk	B B
McGee	does	 not	 show	 that	any	 use	 of	modus ponens	 risks	 being	un-
sound.	Rather,	the	problem	is	restricted	to	more	complex	cases,	where	
the	propositions	in	the	inference	are	themselves	of	a	certain	complex-
ity.	Hale	suggests	that	with	this	caveat	he	can	continue	with	his	pro-
posed	line	of	thought.
So	one	might	continue	to	take	the	meaning	of	the	condi-
tional	 as	 (partially)	 constituted	by	 acceptance	 of	modus 
ponens —	but	 in	 a	 suitably	 restricted	 version.	 The	 argu-
ment	I	develop	in	the	remainder	of	 this	paper	could	be	
straightforwardly	recast	 to	suit	such	a	restricted	version	
of	the	rule.	(Hale,	2002:	291,	footnote	18)
Is	 it	 reasonable	to	assume	such	a	restriction?	Surely	modus ponens	 is	
a	simple	inference	form,	blind	to	the	content	of	premises,	and	hence	
blind	to	the	logical	complexity	of	premises?	That	may	be	so,	but	Hale’s	
proposal	does	not	 require	one	 to	establish	 that	modus ponens	has	re-
stricted	application.	The	point	is	simply	that	only	(acceptance	of)	sim-
ple	instances	of	the	rule	need	be	taken	to	contribute	to	understanding	
of	the	conditional.	More	complicated	examples	may	confuse	someone,	
and	cause	them	to	question	an	inference	even	though	it	is	valid	and	
they	understand	the	constituent	parts.	Similarly,	one	would	not	accuse	
someone	of	misunderstanding	 the	plus	sign	because	 they	systemati-
cally	make	mistakes	 in	complex	sums.	What	counts	 is	whether	 they	
can	do	simpler	sums,	e. g.,	‘2	+	2	=	4’.
Setting	worries	about	modus ponens	aside,	Hale	concludes	that	on	
this	view	of	understanding,	“one	cannot	rationally	entertain	the	pos-
sibility	of	counter-examples”	to	inference	rules	which	are	constitutive	
of	understanding	of	the	logical	operators	(Hale,	2002:	291).	A	problem	
is	then	raised.	Why	is	it	that	we	cannot	raise	doubts	about	the	validity	
of	rules	of	inference,	such	as	modus ponens,	which	are	constitutive	of	
our	understanding	of	logical	operators,	yet	we	can,	and	indeed	should, 
	 	 If	it’s	not	Reagan	who	wins,	it	will	be	Anderson.’	(McGee,	1985:	462)
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general	 and	 conditional —	general,	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 their	
explicit	 formulation	 tells	 us	 that	 a	 conclusion	 of	 some	
specified	 general	 form	 may	 be	 drawn	 from	 premises	
of	 some	 specified	general	 form,	 and	 conditional,	 in	 the	
sense	that	they	tell	us	that	given	premises	of	the	specified	
form,	a	conclusion	of	 the	specified	 form	may	be	drawn.	
Any	reasoning	about	what	inferences	they	permit	—	as	dis-
tinct	from	reasoning	that	simply	uses	those	rules	—	will,	at	
least	 if	 fully	 articulated,	 involve	 reasoning	 from	explicit	
formulations	of	the	rules	….	If	this	is	right,	then	there	is	
what	might	be	called	a	minimal kit	of	inference	rules	—	in-
cluding	 at	 least	 rules	 for	 the	 conditional	 and	 universal	
quantifier	—	required	for	any	reasoning	about	the	sound-
ness	of	any	rules	of	inference.	(Hale,	2002:	299)
This	then	gives	us	the	minimal	logical	toolkit.
In	sum,	Hale	argues	that	an	account	of	our	understanding	of	 the	
logical	 constants	 in	 terms	 of	 (tacit)	 acceptance	 of	 certain	 inference	
rules	 gives	 rise	 to	 the	 conclusion	 that,	 in	 cases	 of	 reasoning	 about	
logical	principles,	there	is	a	minimal	toolkit	of	certain	of	these	(under-
standing-constitutive)	rules	of	inference	which	are	not	open	to	ratio-
nal	doubt.	And	so	the	minimal	toolkit	provides	evidence	of	the	phe-
nomenon	that	there	are	some	(logical)	principles	that	thinkers	cannot	
rationally	doubt.
Hale	connects	the	rational	indubitability	of	some	logical	principles	
to	 our	 understanding	 of	 logical	 constants.	 However,	 it	 is	 not	 clear	
that	 a	 commitment	 to	 this	 view	 of	 understanding	 is	 required.	 The	
understanding-constitutiveness	of	these	principles	rules	out	the	kind	
of	 doubt	 which	 is	 based	 on	 counterexamples:	 these	 would	 simply	
amount	 to	 cases	 of	misunderstanding.	 But	Hale	makes	 a	more	 gen-
eral	point	too:	the	fact	that	certain	principles	are	involved	in	any	rea-
soning	about	logic	rules	out	another	kind	of	doubt	of	their	soundness,	
namely	that	based	on	any	kind	of	reasoning	about	them.	If	“doubt	by	
counterexample”	involves	some	reasoning	about	the	rule	of	inference	
attitude.	Hale	has	already	eliminated	the	option	that	a	rule	R	be	vin-
dicated	by	reasoning	 involving	 itself,	on	pain	of	circularity.13 So,	 the	
reasoning	going	on	 in	considering	and	questioning	 the	validity	of	a	
rule	R	will	have	to	involve	rules	other	than	R.
If	what	I’ve	said	is	right,	any	vindication	of	a	doubt	about	
the	 conservativeness	 (or,	 more	 generally,	 the	 sound-
ness)	of	any	 rules	of	 inference	must	 involve	 reasoning	
which	doesn’t	use	those	rules,	but	uses	some	other	rules	
instead	—	rules	whose	reliability	is	assumed	in	that	rea-
soning.	It	does	not,	of	course,	follow	from	this	that	there	
must	 be	 some	 rules	 whose	 reliability	 must,	 and	 may	
properly,	be	assumed	in	any	demonstration	we	can	give	
of	the	conservativeness	or	non-conservativeness	(more	
generally,	 soundness	 or	 unsoundness)	 of	 any	 (other)	
rules.	It	does	not	follow,	but	it	is	—	or	so	I	believe	—	true.	
(Hale,	2002:	297)
Hale	takes	the	final	step	of	suggesting	that	not	only	will	there	be,	for	
reasoning	about	any	rule	of	inference	R,	some	other	rule	Rʹ	which	is	
assumed	to	be	sound,	but	that	there	will	be	some	rules	which	will	be	
assumed	to	be	sound	when	reasoning	about	any	rule	R.	Hale	points	
out	that	this	does	not	follow	logically.	To	think	so	would	involve	the	
same	mistake	as	taking	it	to	follow	from	everyone	loving	someone,	that	
there	is	someone	that	everyone	loves.	Nevertheless,	it	seems	plausible.
Some	more	concrete	examples	of	rules	we	might	expect	to	employ	
in	 reasoning	 about	 any	 rule	 of	 inference	 are	 suggested	—	e. g.,	 rules	
governing	the	conditional	and	the	universal	quantifier.
Any	rule(s)	of	inference	whose	soundness	we	may	wish	
to	consider	will	—	or	so	I	think	we	may	assume	—	be	both	
13.	 In	some	cases,	a	rule	may	be	self-refuting,	where	the	use	of	R	itself	generates	
the	conclusion	that	R	is	unsound.	So	in	such	cases	circularity	would	not	be	
problematic.	But	this	argument	is	intended	to	apply	generally:	in	general,	it	
would	be	a	bad	idea	to	rely	on	a	rule	of	inference	R	when	engaging	in	rational	
examination	of	the	properties	of	R.
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reasoning from any supposition whatsoever.	If	we	can	show	that	there	are	
indeed	 some	modes	of	 inference	which	we	are	prepared	 to	employ	
in	reasoning	from	any	supposition	whatsoever,	then	we	will	thereby	
show	that	we	are	committed	to	the	belief	that	there	are	some	modes	
of	inference	that	will	preserve	truth no matter what else may be the case, 
which	will	 in	turn	amount	to	showing	that	we	are	committed	to	the	
existence	of	 some	 logically	 (absolutely)	necessarily	 truth-preserving	
modes	of	inference.	Note	that	this	conclusion	would	help	to	strength-
en	Hale’s	position,	in	confirming	that	we	are	indeed	committed	to	the	
belief	that	some	rules	of	inference	are	immune	to	doubt	in	all	contexts	
(in	reasoning	from	any	supposition	whatsoever).
McFetridge’s	account	of	the	content	of	a	belief	in	logical	necessity	
can	be	formulated	as	LN:14
LN		 There	is	some	rule	of	inference	M	such	that	there	is	no	sup-
position	r	such	that,	if	it	were	the	case	that	r,	M	would	not	
preserve	truth.
And	his	account	of	abandoning	the	belief	in	logical	necessity	as	a	be-
lief	in	the	negation	of	LN,	i. e.,
¬LN		 For	every	rule	of	inference	M	there	is	some	supposition	r	
such	that,	if	it	were	the	case	that	r,	M	would	not	preserve	
truth.
There	are	then	two	cases	subsumed	under	a	belief	in	¬LN.	First,	where	
it	 is	known,	for	a	rule	of	inference	M,	which	supposition	or	supposi-
tions	r	would	prevent	M	from	preserving	truth.	On	this	case,	the	rejec-
tion	of	logical	necessity	is	self-refuting:	one	can	simply	amend	the	rule	
to	specify	 that	 it	applies	under	not-r	conditions.	Second,	where	 it	 is	
not	known	which	suppositions	will	prevent	a	rule	M	from	preserving	
truth.	But	then	this	would	cause	irrevocable	damage	to	our	practices	
14.	 “To	abandon	the	belief	in	logical	necessity	would	be	to	believe	that	for	every	
acceptable	mode	of	inference	M	there	is	at	least	one	proposition	r	(it	might	
be	a	very	long	disjunction)	such	that	it	is	illegitimate	to	employ	M	in	an	argu-
ment	which	makes	the	supposition	that	r.”	(McFetridge,	1990:	153)
under	consideration,	then	it	seems	that	general	considerations	to	do	
with	 reasoning	 about	 logic	will	 apply	 in	 any	 case.	 So	 the	 theory	 of	
understanding	need	not	play	as	great	a	role	here.	If,	however,	“doubt	
by	 counterexample”	doesn’t	 involve	any	 reasoning,	 then	 I	 fail	 to	 see	
how	this	can	count	as	rational	doubt.	At	least	the	purported	counter-
example	must	be	recognized	as	being	of	a	certain	general	form,	and	as	
having	certain	unexpected	consequences.	I	do	not	see	how	this	might	
fail	 to	 involve	 at	 least	 some	of	 the	 distinctive	 features	 of	 reasoning	
about	 logic.	 So,	whilst	 I	 am	 sympathetic	 towards	Hale’s	 underlying	
commitment	 to	 an	 account	of	understanding	of	 logical	 constants,	 it	
does	not	look	like	such	a	commitment	is	required	to	get	hold	of	the	
minimal	toolkit.	 I	 take	it	 that	the	element	of	Hale’s	view	concerning	
the	understanding	of	logical	constants,	even	if	it	plays	no	essential	role	
in	arguing	that	some	logical	principles	are	immune	to	rational	doubt,	
may	provide	an	explanation	as	to	why	these	principles	are	indubitable	
in	this	way.
3.3 McFetridge and Belief in Logical Necessity
A	lingering	doubt	 for	Hale’s	minimal	 toolkit	 remains:	he	himself	ad-
mits	 that	 it	 does	not	 conclusively	 establish	 that	 there	 is	 some	privi-
leged	 rule	 of	 inference	 which	 is	 immune	 to	 doubt	 in	 all	 contexts.	
Hale’s	argument	leaves	it	open	that,	although	we	always	need	to	hold	
some	inference	rule	fixed,	this	need	not	be	the	same	rule	in	every	case.	
However,	Hale’s	position	can	be	strengthened	by	introducing	a	related	
line	of	argument	from	McFetridge.
In	“Logical	Necessity:	Some	Issues”	McFetridge	can	be	understood	
as	grappling	with	two	main	issues:	(1)	If	there	is	such	a	thing	as	logical	
necessity,	what	is	it?;	and	(2)	What	is	the	purpose	of	beliefs	about	logi-
cal	necessity?	In	answer	to	(1),	McFetridge	argues	that	if	any	notion	of	
necessity	deserves	to	be	called	logical	necessity,	it	should	be	the	kind	of	
necessity	attaching	to	deductive	validity	(see	McFetridge	[1990:	136]).	
More	important	for	present	purposes	is	his	answer	to	(2).	McFetridge	
equates	 belief that a mode of inference is logically (absolutely) necessar-
ily truth-preserving with	preparedness to employ that mode of inference in 
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To	summarize,	Hale’s	 reasoning	goes	something	 like	 this:	Where	
one	believes	¬LN,	this	means	that	for	any	rule	M,	we	have	to	be	able	to	
recognise	that	circumstances	might	arise	in	which	M	would	fail	(even	
if	we	do	not	know	the	exact	circumstances).	In	order	to	do	so,	some	
reasoning	 will	 be	 involved.	 Such	 reasoning	 would	 have	 to	 involve	
rules	other	than	M;	call	one	such	rule	R.	But	once	both	rules	M	and	R	
are	in	play,	who	is	to	say	that	it	is	rule	M	rather	than	rule	R	which	is	the	
culprit?	In	coming	to	recognise	that	M	might	fail	to	be	truth-preserving	
in	some	circumstances,	it	might	be	that	rule	R	was	defective	and	led	us	
to	an	unfair	opinion	about	M.	At	this	point,	pragmatic	considerations	
will	be	brought	into	play	to	choose	between	the	rules,	including	which	
rule	is	more	or	less	recalcitrant	in	the	light	of	experience.	But	in	order	
to	calculate	these	degrees	of	recalcitrance,	one	will	need	to	do	some	
reasoning,	which	will	involve	the	use	of	some	further	rules,	but	then,	it	
is	again	open	to	lay	the	blame	at	the	door	of	the	new	rule,	rather	than	
the	old.	And	so	on	and	so	forth.	This	falsificationist	methodology	col-
lapses	into	regress.
McFetridge’s	argument	shows	that	our	practices	of	reasoning	from	
suppositions	 commit	us	 to	 a	belief	 that	 some	 rules	of	 inference	are	
truth-preserving	when	reasoning	under	any	supposition	whatsoever,	
whatever	may	be	 the	 case.	Hale	 (2002)’s	 argument	was	not	 able	 to	
show	conclusively	 that	 there	 are	 some	privileged	 rules	of	 inference,	
immune	from	rational	doubt	in	all	contexts,	although	it	was	strongly	
suggested.	McFetridge’s	argument	plugs	the	gap.
3.4 Logic and the Web of Belief
The	contrary	claim,	that	all	principles	should	be	open	to	rational	doubt,	
and	perhaps	revision	under	the	right	circumstances,	 is	familiar	from	
Quine.	I	turn	now	to	some	arguments	against	a	Quinean	approach	to	
the	status	of	logic,	which	show	that	even the Quinean	is	committed	to	
there	being	some	rationally	indubitable	logical	principles.
The	Quinean	view	encompasses	a	kind	of	epistemic	holism,	where-
by	it	is	not	single	beliefs	which	are	the	objects	of	confirmation	or	dis-
confirmation	by	observation	and	experience.	Rather,	it	is	one’s	entire	
of	reasoning	from	suppositions	at	all,	because	we	could	never	know,	
when	reasoning	from	any	supposition	r,	via	rule	M,	whether	r	was	the	
supposition	under	which	reasoning	in	accordance	with	M	fails	to	be	
truth-preserving.	Hence	we	should	reject	¬LN	and	retain	a	belief	in	LN.
I	conclude	then,	that	on	the	present	view	of	what	it	is	to	
regard	 a	 rule	 of	 inference	 as	 logically	 necessarily	 truth-
preserving,	we	are	constrained	to	believe	that	there	are	
such	rules.	For	if	we	abandoned	that	belief,	we	would	be	
unable	 to	 reason	 from	 suppositions	 at	 all.	 (McFetridge,	
1990:	154)
Is	the	argument	successful?	Hale	(1999)	discusses	several	challenges.	
In	 particular,	 he	notes	 that	McFetridge	has	 assumed	 that,	 if	 one	be-
lieves	¬LN,	one	must	be	assured	in	any	case	of	reasoning	that	a	can-
didate	 rule	 to	be	used	 is	 co-tenable	with	 the	 suppositions	 in	play.15 
However,	why	should	this	be	so?	Hale’s	sceptic	retorts:
Why	do	you	assume	that	if	I	am	to	use	a	rule	R	in	reason-
ing	under	the	supposition	that	p,	 I	must	first	be	able	to	
ascertain	whether	R	is,	under	that	supposition,	reliable?	I	
don’t	have	to	do	that.	It	is	enough	that	I	have	no	positive	
reason	to	doubt	that	R	will	fail	under	the	supposition	that	
p.	(1999:	32)
The	sceptic	adheres	to	the	slogan	‘a	rule	is	innocent	until	proven	guilty’,	
and	feels	justified	in	using	a	rule	until	such	time	as	it	may	be	falsified	
by	a	particular	case	of	reasoning	under	a	supposition.	It	isn’t	necessary	
to	determine	whether	or	not	the	rule	is	truth-preserving	in	all	cases	be-
fore	one	gets	going.	Hale	accordingly	mounts	an	attack	on	this	“falsifi-
cationist	methodology”,	in	order	to	show	that	this	kind	of	scepticism	is	
not	an	option,	leaving	McFetridge’s	argument	intact.
15.	 “[C]all	the	range	of	suppositions	under	which	the	use	of	a	mode	of	inference	
M	is	not	questionable	…	its	co-tenability	range.”	(Hale,	1999:	29)	
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logical	principles.	What	principles	may	one	rely	on	when	revising	the	
very	principles	which	underwrite	the	process	of	revision?17
Shapiro	notes	that	this	kind	of	argument	is	similar	to	one	presented	
in	Wright	(1986)	against	the	Quinean	position.	Hale	(1999)	also	pres-
ents	a	version	of	the	argument.	It	begins:
Let	 θ	 be	 some	 theory	we	 are	 putting	 to	 the	 test	 and	 L	
our	 underlying	 logic.	 We	 derive	 from	 θ,	 using	 L,	 vari-
ous	conditional	statements	whose	antecedents	describe	
observationally	checkable	 initial	 conditions,	and	whose	
consequents	specify	observable	predicted	outcomes.	Let	
I→P	be	any	such.	A	series	of	observations	E	will	be	recal-
citrant	 (more	 fully,	 recalcitrant	with	respect	 to	θ+L)	 if	 it	
provides,	or	appears	to	provide,	grounds	to	accept	I	but	
reject	P.	(1999:	37)
In	 the	case	where	E	 is	 recalcitrant,	 the	Quinean	allows	a	number	of	
revisionary	moves.	One	might	change	theory	θ,	such	that	it	no	longer	
constitutes	premises	from	which	I→P	is	derivable.	One	might	change	
logic	L,	such	that	 it	no	 longer	yields	a	derivation	of	 I→P	 from	θ.	Or	
one	might	change	one’s	view	of	E,	such	that	it	is	no	longer	viewed	as	
recalcitrant.	However,	 because	 the	Quinean	 allows	 that	 all	 and	 any	
statements	are	part	of	the	web	of	belief	and	thus	should	be	candidates	
for	revision,	an	additional	option	presents	itself,	viz.	to	reject	the	fol-
lowing	statement	W:
W	 θ├
L
 I→P
Regress	now	threatens	for	the	following	reason:	Standardly,	in	choos-
ing	an	option	for	revision	—	say,	between	revising	θ	or	revising	L	—	the	
Quinean	 will	 bring	 in	 pragmatic	 considerations,	 comparing	 the	 op-
tions	 for	 their	 relative	 degrees	 of	 recalcitrance	 against	 already	 ac-
cepted	beliefs	and	observations.	However,	this	pragmatic	comparison	
rests	upon	acceptance	also	of	W:	if	W	were	not	true,	then	the	degree	
17.	 See	Shapiro	(2000:	346).
network	of	beliefs	—	the	web	of	belief	—	which	faces	the	“tribunal	of	
experience”	as	a	whole.	Beliefs	about	 logic	and	mathematics	are	 in-
cluded	in	this	web.	If	there	is	some	discrepancy	between	the	web	of	
belief	and	experiential	evidence,	then	something	in	the	web	of	belief	
will	have	to	be	modified.	Modifications	can	in	principle	take	place	at	
any	point	in	the	web,	although	some	areas,	such	as	beliefs	about	logic	
and	mathematics,	will	require	exceptionally	strong	recalcitrant	expe-
rience	to	force	their	revision.	This	Quinean	position	does	not	allow	
for	the	kind	of	phenomenon	I	have	been	arguing	for:	given	the	right	
kind	of	recalcitrant	experience,	any	 logical	law	might	be	up	for	revi-
sion	and	jettison,	so	no	logical	law	can	be	immune	to	rational	doubt	
or	rejection.
In	response	to	the	Quinean,	Shapiro	(2000)	contends	that	the	pro-
cess	of	belief-revision	will	 involve	 the	use	of	 logical	principles,	 and	
in	particular,	the	process	of	revision	of	logical	beliefs	will	involve	the	
use	of	 some	 logical	principles.	Of	which	 logic?	The	 same	questions	
regarding	possible	revision	will	be	faced	by	this	second	logic,	which	
will	require	the	use	of	logical	principles.	And	so	on	and	so	forth.	So	
this	kind	of	revision	can	never	get	going	properly.16
The	thought	is	that	the	process	of	maintenance	of	the	web	of	belief	
in	the	light	of	experience	will	sometimes	involve	a	reasoned,	consid-
ered	reaction	to	recalcitrant	experience.	We	must	be	able	to	recognise	
that	an	experience	is	indeed	not	compatible	with	extant	beliefs,	and	
work	out	what	beliefs	will	have	to	be	changed	in	order	to	accommo-
date	the	recalcitrant	experience	with	minimal	trauma	to	the	web.	This,	
surely,	will	 involve	the	use	of	some	logical	principles,	such	as	 those	
governing	coherence	and	compatibility,	and	those	governing	the	use	
of	the	conditional	(to	be	able	to	properly	consider	the	consequences	
of	 different	 changes).	 But	 if	 the	 very	 activities	 of	web-maintenance	
and	 belief-revision	 presuppose	 reliance	 on	 some	 logical	 principles,	
this	will	 cause	 trouble	when	 it	 comes	 to	 revision	of	beliefs	 in	 those	
16.	 See	in	particular	Shapiro	(2000:	338).
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Better	to	think	we	have	made	an	error	in	translating	than	
to	attribute	deep	incoherence.	(Shapiro,	2000:	356)
This	 echoes	 a	 point	which	 I	will	 attempt	 to	 draw	 out	 later,	 namely	
an	 important	distinction	between	our	attitudes	 towards	 rejection	or	
doubt	of	logical	truths,	and	those	towards	rejection	or	doubt	of	other	
purported	 truths	 including metaphysical statements.	 The	 “Gavagai”	 ex-
ample	seems	to	involve	the	field	linguist	assigning	different	folk-meta-
physical	beliefs	to	the	tribe	members.	The	first	translation	ostensibly	
gives	us	a	tribe	believing	in	medium-sized	physical	objects	and	organ-
isms,	 the	 second	a	 tribe	believing	 in	property-instances	 rather	 than	
objects,	 the	 third	 a	 tribe	believing	 in	 the	 existence	of	 parts	 but	not	
ontologically	robust	wholes.	We	might	find	some	of	these	worldviews	
strange,	but	we	do	not	worry	 that	we	are	consigning	the	 tribe	 to	 in-
coherence.	Our	attitudes	towards	rejection	of	purported	metaphysical	
truths	 is	remarkably	accepting	and	tolerant.	 In	contrast,	even	Quine	
has	noticed	that	our	attitudes	towards	rejection	of	logical	truths	is	far	
less	sanguine.	We	might	think	that	someone	who	is	best	interpreted	
as	denying	an	important	metaphysical	truth	to	be	gravely	in	error,	but	
it	seems	that	we	can’t	make	any	good	sense	at	all	of	interpreting	some-
one	as	denying	important	logical	truths.
In	sum,	even	the	Quinean	must	admit	that	there	are	some	logical	
principles	which	lie	outside	the	scope	of	revision.	In	addition,	further	
remarks	from	Quine	highlight	a	distinction	between	our	attitudes	to	
rejection	or	doubt	of	metaphysical,	as	opposed	to	logical,	truths	and	
principles.
3.5 The Minimal Principle of Contradiction
So	far	I	have	presented	some	arguments	for	the	claim	that	there	are	
some	principles	which	are	immune	to	rational	doubt,	but	I	have	not	
presented	 any	 concrete	 example.	 One	 such	 example	 might	 be	 the	
Minimal	Principle	of	Contradiction.
MPC				Not	every	statement	is	true.
of	recalcitrance	of	changes	to,	e. g.,	θ	will	come	out	as	different.	So	the	
process	of	comparison	of	options	all	occurs	conditional	upon	W.	So	
different	combinations	containing	acceptance	and	rejection	of	W	must	
now	be	assessed	for	their	degrees	of	recalcitrance.	But	inevitably	there	
will	be	some	further	hypothesis	underlying	this	exercise	 in	compari-
son,	analogous	to	statement	W.	Hale	concludes:	
Since	all	 such	hypotheses	 are	 in	 the	 pragmatic	melting	
pot	 along	 with	 all	 other	 statements,	 we	 have	 no	 prog-
ress	—	only	regress.	(Hale,	1999:	39)
Such	arguments	show	that	a	Quinean	view	which	excludes	all	state-
ments,	 including	 logical	 statements,	 from	a	special	 status	outside	of	
the	web	of	belief,	cannot	be	sustained,	as	it	will	lead	to	vicious	regress.
Shapiro	highlights	an	additional	detail	of	Quine’s	view	which	pulls	
in	 the	 same	direction.	Quine’s	 thesis	 of	 the	 indeterminacy	of	mean-
ing	has	it	that	linguistic	behaviour	data	systematically	underdetermine	
an	interpretation	or	translation	of	a	linguistic	agent.	In	Quine’s	famil-
iar	example,	a	 linguist	 in	 the	field,	working	to	develop	a	 translation	
manual	for	the	language	of	a	tribe,	is	presented	with	a	tribe	member	
exclaiming	 “Gavagai!”	 in	 the	presence	of	 a	 rabbit.	Not	only	 is	 there	
insufficient	 evidence	 for	 choosing	 a	 translation	 from	 “There	 goes	 a	
rabbit!”,	“There	goes	an	instance	of	rabbitiness!”,	“There	go	some	un-
detached	rabbit-parts!”	and	so	on,	but	Quine	contends	that	each	of	the	
different	possible	translation	manuals	are	equally	correct	—	there	is	no	
fact	of	the	matter	about	meaning.	But	what	about	the	case	of	logical	
vocabulary?	Shapiro	notes:
Quine	 himself	 is	 ambivalent	 on	 the	 semantic	 status	 of	
the	logical	connectives.	In	later	work,	he	suggests	that	if	
a	 radical	 translator	has	a	native	denying	 (or	 refusing	 to	
assent	to)	a	logical	truth,	then	we	have	strong	evidence	
that	we	have	mistranslated.	The	problem	is	that	if	we	in-
terpret	a	native	as	denying	or	refusing	assent	to	a	logical	
truth,	then	we	have	attributed	a	deep	incoherence	to	him.	
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doubt	this	statement?	Well,	it	would	be	to	seriously	entertain,	or	to	try	
to	assert,	something	like	the	following:
It	might	not	be	true	that	not	every	statement	is	true.18
In	rationally	considering	how	things	might	be,	it	will	be	natural	to	con-
sider	how	things	would	be	if	things	were	indeed	that	way.	So,	if	it	were	
not	true	that	not	every	statement	is	true,	how	would	things	be?
If	it	were	not	true	that	not	every	statement	is	true,	then	it	
would	be	true	that	some	statement	is	not	true.
From	it	being	true	that	some	statement	is	not	true,	it	follows	that
Not	every	statement	is	true.
In	considering	how	things	would	be	were	MPC	not	to	be	true,	it	would	
turn	out	that	not	every	statement	would	be	true,	and	hence	that	MPC	
would	be	true	after	all.
This	is	not	intended	to	be	an	argument	for	the	truth	of	MPC.	Rather,	
the	purpose	is	to	highlight	the	relationship	between	MPC	and	rational	
doubt.	But	note	that,	even	in	this	short,	simple	argument,	I	have	relied	
on	some	inference	rules,	namely	those	governing	the	quantifiers,	al-
lowing	me	to	move	from	“not	every	statement”	to	“some	statement”.19 
This	weakens	the	conclusion.	It	is	not	that	in	entertaining	MPC	as	an	
object	of	doubt,	one	immediately	appears	committed	to	MPC,	with	no	
other	rules	of	inference	playing	a	role.	The	arguments	of	the	previous	
sections	were	 intended	 to	 show	at	 the	 very	 least	 that	 one	needs	 to	
rely	on	some	rules	in	any	case	of	reasoning.	If	MPC	is	put	up	for	doubt,	
18.	 The	‘might’	here	should	be	read	as	epistemic	possibility.	What	is	up	for	dis-
cussion	is	doubt,	not	the	thought	that	MPC	is	contingent.
19.	 Thank	you	to	an	anonymous	referee	for	bringing	this	feature	of	the	argument	
to	my	attention.	Perhaps	this	is	just	part	of	the	meaning	of	the	words	‘every’	
and	‘some’,	but	that	would	still	 imply	an	inference	rule	lurking	somewhere.	
I’ve	already	discussed	whether	we	need	to	connect	these	rules	to	our	under-
standing	of	logical	words	above,	in	section	3.2.
Thompson	(1981),	following	Putnam	(1978),	argues	that	MPC	is	true	
and	known	a priori	in	virtue	of	its	being	a	presupposition	of	thought	
and	explanation.
Thompson	 invites	us	 to	consider	a	 thought	experiment:	 Imagine	
trying	to	make	meaningful	utterances	in	a	situation	where	you	have	to	
accept	every	statement	as	true.	The	idea	is	that	such	a	thought	experi-
ment	 is	 self-undermining.	 In	order	 to	even	 imagine	such	a	scenario,	
one	must	be	adhering	to	the	minimal	principle	of	contradiction	by	de-
nying	the	truth	of	something,	namely	MPC.
[I]n	 imagining	 the	 situation	 in	 question,	 we	 presup-
pose	 the	 very	 principle	we	 are	 supposed	 to	 learn	 from	
the	 thought	 experiment.	 In	 order	 to	 imagine	 ourselves	
in	 a	 situation	 in	which	we	 reject	 the	minimal	principle	
of	 contradiction,	we	must	 take	 it	 to	be	 true	 that	 in	 this	
situation	we	reject	the	principle	and	false	that	we	accept	
it.	But	 then	we	 take	 for	granted	at	 the	 start	 that	not	ev-
ery	statement	 is	 true,	which	is	 just	what	the	experience	
is	 supposed	 to	 show.	 This	 predicament	 is	 unavoidable.	
(Thompson,	1981:	460)
Thompson’s	argument	here	 is	difficult	 to	 tease	out.	Moreover,	 there	
are	a	number	of	prima facie	problems.	E. g.,	imagination	is	not	closed	
under	 logical	consequence:	 just	because	 I	 imagine	myself	 in	a	situa-
tion	where	I	reject	MPC,	it	does	not	follow	that	I	imagine	that	in	that	
situation	it	is	true	that	I	reject	MPC	and	false	that	I	accept	it.	Moreover,	
it	appears	 that	some	kind	of	assumption	against	 true	contradictions	
is	being	smuggled	in.	Even	if	in	this	imagined	situation	it	is	true	that	
I	reject	MPC,	why	shouldn’t	it	also	be	true	that	I	accept	MPC?	We	are,	
after	all,	in	the	business	of	casting	doubt	on	MPC,	so	prejudice	against	
contradictions	surely	isn’t	allowed.
I	would	like	to	offer	a	simpler	route	into	highlighting	the	curious	
nature	of	MPC.	Consider	the	question:	What	would	it	be	to	rationally	
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accordingly	give	 rise	 to	 laws	 for	 thinking	about	 anything,	 about	no	
particular	subject	matter;	hence	they	are	laws	of	thought	as	such.22
Consider	cases	of	laws	less	general	than	logical	laws,	such	as	the	
laws	of	physics.	The	laws	of	physics	describe	regularities	of	the	physi-
cal	 world:	 they	 are	 true	 general	 statements	 about	 physical	 objects,	
properties	and	processes.	Arising	from	these	are	norms	or	standards	
for	counting	as	thinking	about	physical	objects.	Suppose	I	believe	that	
the	force	exerted	on	an	object	is	equal	to	its	mass	plus	its	acceleration.	
In	order	for	my	belief	to	really	be	about	physical	objects,	 it	must	be	
appropriate	to	evaluate	it	as	wrong,	given	the	laws	of	physics.	It	may	
well	be	that	my	belief	is	neither	right	nor	wrong	in	light	of	the	laws	of	
physics,	because	I	am	thinking	about	some	other	kind	of	thing	—	say,	
alien	schmysical	objects.23
Insofar	as	one’s	activity	is	to	count	as	making	judgments	
about	the	physical	world	at	all,	it	must	be	assessable	for	
correctness	 in	 light	of	 the	 laws	of	physics.	 In	 this	sense,	
the	 laws	of	physics	provide	constitutive norms	 for	 the	ac-
tivity	of	thinking	about	the	physical	world.	(MacFarlane,	
2002:	36–37)
If	 one	 considers	 thought	 about	 any	 subject	matter	whatsoever,	 not	
restricted	to	a	particular	domain	such	as	physical objects,	one	will	en-
counter	completely	general	standards	for	thought.	Frege	took	the	laws	
of	 logic	to	be	the	most	general	truths	there	are,	about	absolutely	ev-
erything.	If	the	laws	of	logic	are	general	truths	about	everything,	then,	
22.	 See	Textor	(2011,	chapter	1)	for	more	on	Frege	on	arithmetic,	logic	and	logical	
laws.
23.	 This	kind	of	view	does	not	require	that	one	know	what	the	laws	of	physics	ac-
tually	are.	It	would	be	inconsistent	for	me	to	believe	that	L	is	a	law	of	physics	
and	also	to	believe	something	about	the	behaviour	of	a	physical	object	which	
contradicts	L.	But	this	would	be	straight	 logical	 inconsistency.	The	point	 is	
that,	in	believing	something	about	a	physical	object	which	goes	against	what	
the	 laws	of	physics	actually	are,	 I	should	count	as	doing	something	wrong,	
whether	I	know	it	or	not,	if	what	I	am	doing	is	to	count	objectively	as	thought	
about	physical	objects.	If	what	I	am	doing	isn’t	counted	as	(right	or)	wrong,	
then	I	am	doing	something	else,	e. g.,	thinking	about	alien	objects.	
then	if	we	are	to	rationally	consider	this,	we	will	need	to	trust	some	
rule	or	other.	 In	 this	case,	 it	was	most	natural	 to	 rely	on	 the	quanti-
fier	rules.	(At	least	they	are	different	to	the	principle	under	question:	
Thompson’s	 thought	experiment	appeared	 to	smuggle	 in	something	
like	a	principle	of	non-contradiction.)	The	alternative,	where	no	rules	
are	brought	to	bear	at	all,	would	count	no	longer	as	rational	doubt,	but	
as	mere	unreflective	foot-stamping.
What	is	it	to	doubt	something?	At	the	very	least	it	will	involve	en-
tertaining	the	thought	that	it	might	not	be	true.20 In	entertaining	that	
the	object	of	doubt	might	not	be	true,	I	have	argued	that	rational	re-
flection	on	this	leads	quickly	to	one’s	entertaining	MPC.	As	this	exer-
cise	is	one	of	rational	doubt,	some	rules	of	inference	are	relied	upon.	
Allowing	 for	 this,	 it	would	seem	that	an	attempt	 to	 rationally	doubt	
MPC	brings	in	the	thought	that	MPC	might	be	true,	hence	undermin-
ing	that	doubt.	Thus	we	have	evidence	of	a	logical	principle	which	is	
immune	to	rational	doubt.
4 Alternative Explanations
I	have	provided	a	number	of	 reasons	 to	 think	 that	 there	are	 logical	
principles	which	are	immune	to	rational	doubt.21 The	next	step	is	to	
give	 an	 explanation	 of	 this	 phenomenon.	 I	will	 first	 consider	 some	
candidate	explanations	which	fail.
First,	 I	will	 consider	MacFarlane’s	 interpretation	of	 Frege	on	 logi-
cal	laws.	Frege	primarily	takes	the	laws	of	logic	to	be	the	laws	of	truth.	
These	 are	 descriptive	 laws,	 general	 truths,	 where	 ‘general’	 means	
that	 they	 apply	 to	 everything.	However,	 he	 argues	 that,	 in	 addition	
to	these	descriptive	general	truths,	arising	out	of	the	laws	of	truth	are	
prescriptive	laws	of	thought.	Because	the	laws	of	truth	are	completely	
general,	in	the	sense	that	they	are	about	absolutely	everything,	they	
20.	Even	if	more	is	involved,	the	thought	is	at	least	entertained.
21.	 There	are	further	avenues	that	could	be	pursued	here,	which	I	will	skip	for	
reasons	of	 space.	For	example,	an	 interesting	 link	might	be	drawn	here	 to	
Wittgenstein’s	hinge	propositions	(see	Wittgenstein	[1969]).
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actual,	not	only	the	intuitable,	but	everything	thinkable.	
(Frege,	1884,	section	14)
According	 to	 Frege,	 the	 laws	 of	 arithmetic	 govern	 all	 that	 is	 think-
able.	Do	 the	 laws	 of	 arithmetic	 quantify	 over	 everything?	 Presum-
ably	not.	We	normally	think	of	laws	of	arithmetic	as	quantifying	over	
numbers	(or	providing	schemata	with	places	for	numbers).	But	if	the	
laws	of	arithmetic	quantify	over	or	contain	places	for	numbers,	and	
govern	the	behaviour	of	numbers	and	arithmetical	functions,	in	what	
sense	can	they	be	said	to	govern	everything thinkable?	In	the	following	
sense:	everything	which	falls	under	a	(non-vague)	concept	is	numer-
able	or	countable.
The	only	barrier	to	countability	is	to	be	found	in	the	per-
fection	of	 concepts.	Bald	people	 for	example	cannot	be	
counted	as	long	as	the	concept	of	baldness	is	not	defined	
so	precisely	that	for	any	individual	there	can	be	no	doubt	
whether	 it	 falls	under	 it	or	not.	Thus	the	domain	of	 the	
countable	is	as	wide	as	the	domain	of	conceptual	thought.	
(Frege,	1980:	100)25
(Frege	ultimately	argues	 that	vague	predicates	do	not	correspond	to	
any	concept,	so	the	restriction	to	falling	under	a	non-vague	concept	
is	really	no	restriction	at	all.)	We	can	think	only	about	things	which	
fall	 under	 concepts,26 so	 everything	 which	 we	 can	 think	 about	 is	
countable.27
25.	 As	cited	in	Textor	(2011:	16).
26.	The	simplest	explanation	of	this	is	that	everything	falls	under	a	concept,	un-
derstood	in	the	Fregean	sense,	i. e.,	something	like	a	property:	to	think	other-
wise	would	be	to	commit	oneself	to	the	existence	of	bare	particulars.
27.	 That	 a	 domain	 is	 ‘countable’	 is	 often	 understood	 as	meaning	 that	 the	 ele-
ments	of	 the	domain	can	be	mapped	one-one	 to	 the	natural	numbers.	But	
Frege	doesn’t	mean	to	claim	that	the	domain	of	all	things	is	countable.	(That	
would	be	false.	For	one,	not	every	point	on	a	line	can	be	counted	in	this	way,	
let	alone	everything	 there	 is.)	Rather,	Frege’s	 claim	 that	a	given	domain	 is	
‘countable’	 is	 to	be	understood	as	 the	claim	that	 the	domain	 is	 ‘numerable’,	
following	the	same	line	of	thought	as	above,	if	I	want	to	count	as	think-
ing	about	anything,	what	I	am	doing	must	count	as	right	or	wrong	in	
light	of	those	laws.	But	this	time,	there	is	no	alternative	realm	of	which	
I	might	be	thinking	(as	with	the	schmysical	objects).	If	I	am	not	think-
ing	about	 something	out	of	 everything,	 there	 is	nothing	 left	 for	my	
thought	to	be	about.	
While	 physical	 laws	 provide	 constitutive	 norms	 for	
thought	about the physical world,	logical	laws	provide	con-
stitutive	norms	for	thought	as such.	(MacFarlane,	2002:	37)
In	order	to	count	as	thinking	at all,	what	I	am	doing	must	count	as	right	
or	wrong	in	light	of	the	most	general	laws	which	cover	every	possible	
domain	of	thought.	If	one’s	activity	is	not	evaluable	in	light	of	these	
norms,	 then	 it	cannot	be	about	anything;	hence	one	must	be	doing	
something	other	than	thinking.	The	explanation	of	the	phenomenon	
is	thus	that	we	cannot	rationally	doubt	the	very	normative	standards	
evaluability	in	light	of	which	is	constitutive	of	thought	—	including	ra-
tional	doubt	—	at	all.	The	explanation	is	that	the	laws	of	logic	are	con-
stitutive	norms	for	thought.
I	 am	 sympathetic	 to	 the	 view	 that	 laws	 of	 logic	 are	 constitutive	
norms	for	thought,	but	I	think	a	different	rationale	to	that	offered	by	
(MacFarlane’s)	Frege	is	to	be	preferred.	A	substantial	worry	about	this	
strategy	 is	 that	 it	 cannot	draw	a	 line	between	 the	 laws	of	 logic	and	
other	general	truths	which	are	about	“everything”.	First,	in	what	sense	
are	the	laws	of	logic	about	“everything”?24	Take	the	generality	of	the	
laws	of	arithmetic.
The	truths	of	arithmetic	govern	all	that	is	numerable.	This	
is	the	widest	domain	of	all;	for	to	it	belongs	not	only	the	
24.	 To	put	forward	a	careful	interpretation	of	Frege	here	would	be	too	great	a	task	
for	present	purposes.	If	what	I	write	is	not	a	faithful	rendering	of	what	Frege	
intended,	at	 least	 it	 is	a	Fregean	 view	under	consideration.	See	MacFarlane	
(2002)	and	Textor	(2011)	for	more	detailed	interpretations.
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Consider	 cases	 of	 purported	 “laws	 of	metaphysics”.	E. g.,	 Frege	may	
have	endorsed	something	like	the	following	statement:
Everything	is	either	an	object	or	a	function.
There	 are	 other	 general	 statements	 that	 some	 philosophers	 have	
endorsed:
Everything	is	a	thinking	substance.
Everything	is	perceptible.
Everything	is	a	particular.
Surely	these	are	intended	to	be	about	everything?	Moreover,	they	are	
more	obviously	about	everything	than	the	laws	of	logic	and	arithme-
tic,	given	that	they	quantify	directly	over	all	things,	not	over	an	inter-
mediary	which	in	turn	applies	to	all	 things.	But,	and	here	is	the	rub,	
surely	we	do	not	want	to	claim	that	metaphysical	truths	are	immune	
from	rational	doubt?	The	very	bread	and	butter	of	a	discipline	such	as	
metaphysics	 is	 to	continually	question	 these	kinds	of	 statements,	 to	
consider	 them,	to	offer	arguments	and	justifications	 in	 favour	of	(or	
against)	them.
Recall,	the	brief	was	to	provide	an	explanation	of	a	particular	phe-
nomenon,	 namely	 the	 rational	 indubitability	 of	 some	 logical	 prin-
ciples.	 In	offering	 the	above	explanation,	one	not	only	accounts	 for	
the	logical	laws,	but	gets	any	similarly	general	laws	about	everything	
for	free,	be	they	laws	of	arithmetic,	or	metaphysical	truths,	and	so	on.	
The	explanation	fails	in	overstepping	the	brief,	and	ushering	in	new	
commitments	to	the	rational	indubitability	of	principles	that	we	would	
rather	keep	open	to	debate.
Another	 alternative	 explanation	might	 run	 as	 follows:	 Isn’t	 it	 be-
cause	we	want	our	thought	to	accord	with	how	things	are	absolutely	
necessarily?	 If	 thought	aims	at	 truth,	 then	thought	will	aim	at	being	
correct	about	how	things	are.	In	particular,	thought	will	always	count	
One	 can	understand	Fregean	generality	 of	 the	 laws	of	 logic	 in	 a	
similar	way.	A	law	such	as
∀p∀q(p	⊃	(q	⊃	p))
ostensibly	quantifies	over	propositions.	A	schematic	presentation	of	
the	law
A ⊃	(B	⊃	A)
contains	 letters	which	act	as	place-holders	 for	 sentences	or	proposi-
tions.	So,	aren’t	the	laws	of	logic	a	specialized	science	about	proposi-
tions	 or	 sentences?	No.	 Propositions	 (sentences)	 can	 be	 about	 any-
thing,	just	as	numbers	can	count	anything.	So	the	laws	of	logic	govern	
everything	 thinkable,	 in	virtue	of	governing	propositions	which	can	
be	about	anything	thinkable.
However,	 there	 are	other	 laws	 (general	 truths)	which	 are	 “about	
everything”	 and	which	 are	not	 rationally	 indubitable,	 or	 immune	 to	
rational	rejection,	or	otherwise	binding	on	our	thought.	If	this	expla-
nation	works	 for	 logical	 laws,	 then	any	other	 laws	which	constitute	
general	truths	about	everything	should	also	be	rationally	indubitable,	
and	yet	 they	 are	not.	One	 can	already	 see	 that	 the	 laws	of	 arithme-
tic,	on	this	view,	should	be	binding	for	thought	in	this	way.	Are	they?	
Maybe,	maybe	not.	More	worrying	is	the	possibility	of	general	truths	
which	 directly	 quantify	 over	 everything,	 or	which	 are	 “about	 every-
thing”	 directly,	 without	 any	 intermediary	 numbers	 or	 propositions.	
i. e.,	it	has	a	(cardinal)	number,	which	might	be	a	finite	or	an	infinite	number.	
Frege	writes:	“The	concept	‘syllables	in	the	word	three’	picks	out	the	word	as	
a	whole,	and	as	indivisible	in	the	sense	that	no	part	of	it	falls	any	longer	under	
that	same	concept.	Not	all	concepts	possess	this	quality.	We	can,	for	example,	
divide	up	something	falling	under	the	concept	‘red’	into	parts	in	a	variety	of	
ways,	without	the	parts	thereby	ceasing	to	fall	under	the	same	concept	‘red’.	
To	a	concept	of	 this	kind	no finite number	will	belong”	 (Frege,	1884,	section	
54,	my	emphasis).	There	may	be	“uncountably	many”	entities	which	fall	un-
der	a	concept	such	as	“red”,	meaning	that	the	red	things	cannot	be	mapped	
one-one	to	the	natural	numbers,	but	such	a	concept	may	still	have	a	number,	
albeit	an	infinite	number.	
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should	consider	first	how	it	needs	to	be	related	to	thought	to	account	
for	its	bindingness,	and	worry	about	truth	later.
5 Constitutive Norms for Thought
5.1 A Kantian Sketch
In	essence,	my	proposal	is	that	Frege	was	right	but	for	the	wrong	rea-
sons.	The	laws	of	 logic	are	constitutive	norms	of	thought.	There	are	
some	normative	laws,	evaluability	in	light	of	which	is	constitutive	of	
thought.	That’s	just	what	thought	is:	a	mental	activity	which	is	subject	
to	rules	of	a	peculiar	kind.	These	are	the	“laws	of	thought”.	And	the	
kind	of	principles	that	arise	from	considering	the	predicament	of	be-
ing	unable	to	step	away	from	these	norms	look	to	be	familiar	and	basic	
logical	principles.	So	we	can	take	the	laws	of	logic	(or	at	least	the	most	
basic	laws	of	logic)	to	be	the	laws	of	thought:	constitutive	norms	for	
thought	as	such.	This	view	provides	us	with	the	best	explanation	of	a	
particular	phenomenon.	If	we	accept	that	there	are	rationally	indubi-
table	principles,	this	means	that	it	is	impossible	for	us	to	step	out	of	
our	thought	being	evaluable	in	light	of	these	principles.	A	good	expla-
nation	of	this	is	that	for	one’s	mental	activity	to	be	thinking	just is	for	it	
to	be	evaluable	in	light	of	certain	norms.
The	primary	aim	of	 this	paper,	as	stated	at	 the	outset,	was	to	 for-
mulate	an	argument	with	 the	conclusion	 that	 laws	of	 logic	are	 laws	
of	thought.	This	has	been	done.	Nevertheless,	one	can’t	help	wanting	
a	bit	more	detail	on	how	the	view	should	be	developed.	The	Fregean	
account	could	expand	upon	the	view	in	terms	of	the	relationship	be-
tween	descriptive	and	prescriptive	general	laws,	but	I	have	argued	that	
the	account	fails.	There	is	no	space	to	give	a	fully	developed	account	
here,	but	I	will	briefly	sketch	an	option	which	I	take	to	be	promising,	
and	which	coheres	with	the	historical	roots	of	the	view.
I	will	 start	with	 the	assumption	 that	 thought	 is	 a	normative	phe-
nomenon.	Take	an	example	of	representational	thought,	e. g.,	thinking	
that	a is F.	It	makes	sense	to	describe	how	this	representation	succeeds	
in	being	“about”	a	 in	terms	of	norms	and	correctness:	 if	 the	thought	
as	correct	or	incorrect	according	to	how	things	are	absolutely	neces-
sarily.	Perhaps	this	explains	why	thinkers	are	always	evaluable	in	light	
of	certain	principles	—	because	thought	aims	at	truth,	and	the	relevant	
principles	are	always	true,	no	matter	what.	
However,	 this	 fails	 as	 an	 adequate	 explanation	 of	 the	 phenome-
non.	An	attempt	to	raise	doubts	concerning,	e. g.,	modus ponens	does	
not	break	down	simply	because	it	is	always	valid	no	matter	what	(or	
because	a	propositional	rendering	of	it	is	always	true);	rather,	it	is	be-
cause	it	is	an	integral	part	of	the	very	apparatus	we	use	to	raise	doubts	
about	 logical	 principles.	 Simply	 being	 true	 or	 valid	 no	matter	what	
doesn’t	seem	to	imply	that	a	proposition	or	rule	is	part	of	this	minimal	
logical	apparatus	(although	an	implication	may	turn	out	to	run	in	the	
other	direction).	One	can	raise	a	similar	objection	here	to	that	directed	
towards	the	Fregean	view:	 it	explains	too	much.	Some	philosophers	
take	metaphysical	necessity	to	be	absolute	necessity.28 If	they	are	right,	
and	if	absolute	necessities	are	supposed	to	be	rationally	indubitable,	
then	metaphysical	necessities	will	be	counted	as	 rationally	 indubita-
ble.	But	it	is	not	true	that	(purported)	metaphysical	necessities	—	such	
as	that	Socrates	is	a	human,	and	not	a	boiled	egg;	or	that	Elizabeth	II	
has	George	VI	for	a	father;	or	that	water	is	H2O	—	are	immune	to	ratio-
nal	doubt.	So	one	cannot	claim	both	that	metaphysical	necessity	is	ab-
solute,	and	that	the	phenomenon	of	rationally	indubitable	principles	
can	be	explained	in	terms	of	striving	to	think	in	accordance	with	how	
things	are	absolutely	necessarily.
Note	that	these	two	failed	explanations	start	with	the	idea	that	the	
laws	of	logic	have	a	particular	and	primary	relation	to	truth:	they	are	
the	most	general	truths,	or	they	are	particularly	robustly	(absolutely	
necessarily)	true.	But,	prima facie,	there	is	no	principled	reason	to	ex-
pect	a	particular	relation	to	truth	to	generate	a	peculiarly	binding	re-
lation	to	thought.	It	seems	that	taking	this	kind	of	approach	is	never	
going	to	generate	a	satisfactory	explanation	of	rational	indubitability.	
Rather	than	taking	an	outward-looking	approach	to	logic,	perhaps	we	
28.	See	Hale	(1999);	Shalkowski	(2004).	
	 jessica	leech Logic and the Laws of Thought
philosophers’	imprint	 –		18		– vol.	15,	no.	12	(march	2015)
My	suggestion	is	this:	In	the	case	of	mere	thought,	we	cannot	make	
sense	of	it	as	a	normative	phenomenon	in	terms	of	norms	arising	from	
how	things	are	with	what	is	represented	(what	the	thought	is	about),	
because	 mere	 thoughts	 do	 not	 succeed	 in	 representing	 any	 object	
(they	are	not	about	any	thing).	We	are	 left	only	with	bare	norms	for	
how	thoughts	should	be	put	together	and	related	to	one	another,	i. e.,	
logical	principles.	So	general	logical	principles	are	required	to	provide	
norms	 to	 constitute	 thought	 as	 a	 normative	 phenomenon.	Thought	
in	 the	broadest	 sense	 is	 constituted	by	evaluability	 in	 light	of	 these	
general	logical	principles.
This	 line	of	 thought	needs	 to	be	 explored	more	 thoroughly	 else-
where.	Apart	 from	fleshing	out	 the	Kantian	 suggestion,	 the	 starting	
point	of	taking	thought	to	be	normative	would	also	need	more	atten-
tion.	(I	suggest	below	that	thought	understood	as	an	activity,	as	some-
thing	we	do,	plausibly	requires	rules	 for	 its	practice,	which	could	be	
a	 starting	 point	 here.)	However,	 the	 suggestion	 to	 be	 kept	 in	mind	
is	that,	allowing	for	thoughts	which	fall	short	of	representing	the	ob-
jective	world,	 and	 taking	 a	 general	 view	of	 thought	 as	 a	 normative	
phenomenon,	may	give	us	the	tools	to	give	a	more	satisfying	account	
of	why	logical	laws	are	constitutive	norms	for	thought.	My	aim	in	the	
present	paper	has	been	to	give	an	argument	for	thinking	that	they	are.
There	is	also	an	interesting	contrast	to	be	made	between	the	Kan-
tian	approach	outlined	and	the	Fregean	explanation.	The	Fregean	ar-
gued	that	the	laws	of	logic	were	about	everything,	so	any	thought,	in	
order	to	be	about	anything,	had	to	conform	to	logic.	By	contrast,	the	
Kantian	approach	leaves	room	for	thoughts	that	are	not	properly	ob-
jective,	 that	are	 indeed	not	about	anything.	 If	 the	Kantian	 is	 in	gen-
eral	right	to	defend	a	distinction	between	mere	thought	and	cognition,	
then	the	Fregean	can	give	no	account	of	why	mere	thought	should	still	
be	subject	to	the	laws	of	logic.	If	such	thoughts	are	not	about	anything,	
then	they	can	no	longer	be	held	accountable	to	laws	which	are	about	
everything.
Furthermore,	this	connects	to	Kant	and	Frege’s	differing	views	on	
generality.	
isn’t	correct	or	incorrect	depending	upon	how	things	are	with	a,	then	
it	doesn’t	make	sense	to	think	of	it	as	being	about	a.
Next,	throughout	Kant’s	work	he	makes	a	distinction	between	mere 
thought	and	cognition.	Very	briefly,	cognitions	are	objective	representa-
tions	which	succeed	 in	being	about	 the	world,	 through	adhering	 to	
certain	constraints	on	possible	experience.	Those	constraints	are	(syn-
thetic	a priori)	principles	arising	from	the	categories,	a priori	concepts	
the	possession	and	deployment	of	which	are	a	requirement	for	us	to	
have	 experience	 and	 knowledge	 of	 an	 objective	world.	 By	 contrast,	
mere	thoughts	do	not	achieve	objectivity:	they	are	not	properly	about	
the	world.	Thoughts	are	still	held	to	certain	structural,	general logical 
standards,	but	mere	thoughts	fall	short	of	the	constraints	which	would	
afford	them	objectivity.	For	example,	according	to	Kant,	 the	thought	
that	 there is a figure enclosed by two straight lines	 conforms	 to	 general	
logical	laws,	in	particular	it	does	not	contain	any	contradiction,	but	it	
is	incompatible	with	the	relevant	synthetic	a priori	principles.29	Such	a	
thought	therefore	could	have	no	instance	in	the	empirical	world,	and	
so	it	falls	short	of	objectivity.
To	cognize	an	object,	it	is	required	that	I	be	able	to	prove	
its	 possibility	 (whether	 by	 the	 testimony	 of	 experience	
from	 its	 actuality	 or	 a priori	 through	 reason).	 But	 I	 can	
think	whatever	I	like,	as	long	as	I	do	not	contradict	myself,	
i. e.,	 as	 long	as	my	concept	 is	 a	possible	 thought.	 (Kant,	
1998,	Bxxvi,	footnote,	emphasis	in	the	original)
Another	 example	 (which	 does	 not	 rely	 on	 Kant’s	 precarious	 views	
about	 geometry)	might	 be	 thoughts	 about	 causally	 isolated	 objects.	
Such	thoughts	would	be	in	violation	of	principles	of	cause	and	effect	
which	Kant	took	to	be	necessary	conditions	on	the	possibility	of	cogni-
tion	of	the	empirical	world.	Nevertheless,	there	doesn’t	seem	to	be	any	
logical	problem,	or	any	difficulty	with	making	sense	of	such	a	thought.
29.	 In	 this	case,	 it	 is	 incompatible	with	 the	Euclidean	 laws	of	geometry,	which	
Kant	thought	were	necessary	conditions	of	our	experience	of	things	in	space.
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some	kind	of	active	control,	whereas	dreams	are	something	that	we	
can’t	control;	they	just	“happen	to	us”.	I	might	not	actively	choose	all	
of	my	thoughts	—	a	thought	might	“pop	into	my	head”	for	various	rea-
sons	 (e. g.,	 I	 see	a	 tree	 in	 front	of	me	and	 thereby	 think,	 “There	 is	a	
tree”)	—	but	I	at	least	have	enough	control	over	my	thoughts	to	reflect	
upon	them	and,	where	necessary,	revise	them	(e. g.,	if	I	learn	that	there	
is	only	a	hologram	of	a	tree).	Insofar	as	I	can	exert	some	control	over	
my	 thoughts,	 it	 seems	 reasonable	 that	 there	might	 be	 standards	 ac-
cording	to	which	I	may	do	so.	By	contrast,	 it	seems	unfair	 to	hold	a	
mental	phenomenon	over	which	we	have	little	or	no	control	to	norma-
tive	standards.	 Indeed,	 the	passive	nature	of	our	dreaming	may	pro-
vide	an	explanation	of	why	we	don’t	typically	censure	illogical	dreams	
as	being	somehow	“wrong”	—	weird,	yes,	but	not	incorrect.30
To	properly	address	the	range	of	philosophical	and	psychological	
work	on	the	nature	of	dreaming	would	be	beyond	the	scope	of	 this	
paper,	but	the	idea	that	dreams	are	not	subject	to	logical	standards	is	
supported	by	some	of	the	literature.
For	 example,	 Hobson	 (1999)	 claims	 that	 events	 within	 dreams	
are	 not	 subject	 to	 reasons,	 and	 that	 dreamers	 are	 in	 a	 non-rational	
state,	although	he	shies	away	from	allowing	that	one	could	dream	“an	
evident	 contradiction”,	 on	pain	 of	 disrupting	 the	flow	of	 the	dream-
narrative:	“In	a	word,	the	limits	of	dream	content	are	the	same	as	the	
limits	 of	 dream	narratability”	 (Hobson,	 1999:	 410).	However,	 if	Gra-
ham	 Priest	 can	 offer	 us	 a	 plausible	waking	 narrative	 containing	 ex-
plicit	contradictions,31 I	see	no	reason	why	a	dream	narrative	couldn’t	
accommodate	something	similar.	Regardless	of	what	it	is	possible	to	
30.	There	 is	 indeed	the	phenomenon	known	as	“lucid	dreaming”,	whereby	the	
dreamer	can	exert	control	over	the	course	of	dream	events.	But	I	take	it	that	
this	is	rare,	and	that	typically	dreams	are	outside	of	our	control,	just	as	typi-
cally	thoughts	are	within	our	control.
31.	 For	 example:	 “I	walk	out	 of	 the	 room;	 for	 an	 instant,	 I	 am	 symmetrically	
poised,	one	foot	in,	one	foot	out,	my	center	of	gravity	lying	on	the	vertical	
plane	 containing	 the	 center	 of	 gravity	 of	 the	door.	Am	 I	 in	 or	 not	 in	 the	
room?	By	 symmetry,	 I	 am	neither	 in	 rather	 than	not	 in,	nor	not	 in	 rather	
than	in	….	But	wait	a	minute.	If	I	am	neither	in	nor	not	in,	then	I	am	not	(in)	
and	not	(not	in).	But	the	law	of	double	negation,	I	am	both	in	and	not	in.	
For	Kant,	 the	generality	of	 logical	 laws	consists	 in	 their	
abstraction	 from	 the	 content	 of	 judgments,	 while	 for	
Frege,	 the	generality	of	 logical	 laws	consists	 in	 their	un-
restricted	quantification	over	all	objects	and	all	concepts.	
(MacFarlane,	2002:	32)
Kant	distinguished	between	two	kinds	of	logic:	general	logic	and	tran-
scendental	 logic	 (Kant,	 1998,	A50–57/B74–82).	Transcendental	 logic	
comprises	rules	for	the	special	employment	of	the	understanding	to	
thoughts	 and	 judgments	 about	 objects	 of	 possible	 experience,	 i. e.,	
objects	that	conform	to	the	conditions	under	which	the	human	mind	
is	able	to	have	objective	representational	thoughts	and	empirical	ex-
periences.	 In	short,	 transcendental	 logic	gives	us	rules	 for	cognition.	
General	logic,	in	contrast,	abstracts	from	all	content	of	judgment,	and	
hence	comprises	rules	for	the	employment	of	the	understanding	tout 
court,	with	no	restriction	as	to	subject	matter.	General	 logic	gives	us	
rules	 for	 thought	as	 such.	Recall,	 the	main	problem	 for	 the	Fregean	
view	was	that	the	laws	of	logic	are	not	the	only	truths	which	are	about	
everything.	But	perhaps	this	is	simply	the	wrong	way	to	think	of	the	
generality	 of	 logic.	 The	 Kantian	 account	 of	 generality	 distinguishes	
logical	laws	as	abstracting	away	from	all	content,	and	therefore	avoids	
this	kind	of	problem.
5.2 Thoughts and Non-Thoughts
Are	there	any	mental	activities	or	states	which	do	not	appear	to	be	sub-
ject	to	the	same	kinds	of	norms?	If	so,	such	activities	or	states	would	
thereby	be	classified	as	non-thoughts.	A	test	of	the	present	proposal	
would	thus	be	the	plausibility	of	these	classifications.	Three	potential	
examples	come	to	mind.
First,	 consider	 dreaming.	 We	 do	 not	 demand	 logical	 coherence	
from	 our	 dreams,	 but	 dreaming	 is	 still	 arguably	 some	 kind	 of	men-
tal	state	or	activity.	Moreover,	classifying	dreaming	as	a	recognisable	
mental	phenomenon	that	isn’t	thinking	as	such	seems	plausible.	For	
one,	thinking	seems	to	be	something	over	which	we	can	typically	exert	
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are	 that	 they	 are	professed	 to	be	 arational	 and	automatic.	They	 are	
arational,	not	directly	subject	 to	 rational	norms,34 rather	 than	 irratio-
nal,	 in	violation	of	 rational	norms:	 “Though	aliefs	may	be	useful	or	
detrimental,	 laudable	or	 contemptible,	 they	are	neither	 rational	nor	
irrational”	 (Gendler,	 2008b:	 557).	They	 are	 also	 automatic;	 they	 are	
not	something	we	form	through	conscious	thought	and	deliberation,	
but	are	rather	formed	through	associations	and	habits:	“Though	a	sub-
ject	may	be	consciously	aware	of	her	aliefs,	aliefs	operate	without	the	
intervention	of	conscious	thought”	(Gendler,	2008b:	557).	So	we	have	
a	mental	state	that	is,	arguably,	not	subject	to	logical	laws,	and	that	is	
plausibly	not	a	kind	of	thinking	but	rather	an	habituated	reaction	(au-
tomatic,	not	active),	which	may	have	some	kind	of	conceptual	content	
(e. g.,	bedpan,	dirty,	avoid),35 but	which	is	not	something	we	do,	under	
our	direct	control,	as	in	thinking.	Whether	or	not	there	is	a	distinctive	
state	of	alief,	and	if	there	is,	what	its	precise	nature	and	role	are,	are	
disputed	matters.	But	if	there	is	a	genuine	mental	phenomenon	that	
Gendler	has	highlighted	—	regardless	of	the	correct	label	for	it	—	with	
these	 key	 features,	 then	we	 have	 another	 plausible	 candidate	 for	 a	
mental	state	which	is	both	not	a	kind	of	thinking,	and	also	not	subject	
to	logical	laws.
A	more	 troublesome	 case	might	 be	 the	 idea	 of	 a	 stream	 of	 con-
sciousness,	 composed	 of	 “snatches	 of	 thought”.	 Thus	 far	 I	 have	 em-
ployed	a	working	notion	of	thought	as	minimally	entertaining	propo-
sitions.	A	thought	can	be	this	minimal,	although	it	can	be	more.	How-
ever,	a	stream	of	consciousness	may	be	made	up	of	“thoughts”	that	do	
not	even	 involve	 something	as	well-formed	as	a	proposition,	 e. g.,	 a	
sub-propositional	“fragment”.
In	 response,	 one	 can	 claim	 that	 the	 scope	of	my	 account	 covers	
only	thoughts	which	fulfil	the	minimal	condition	of	entertaining	of	a	
34.	Aliefs	could	be	indirectly	subject	to	rational	norms.	E. g.,	if	one	has	inconsis-
tent	beliefs	and	aliefs,	of	which	one	is	aware,	one	might	feel	some	obligation	
to	somehow	bring	one’s	aliefs	into	line	with	one’s	beliefs.
35.	 I	have	 taken	 this	way	of	presenting	 the	content	of	alief	 from	Mandelbaum	
(2013).
dream,	the	point	is	that,	if	we	do	dream	explicit	contradictions,	they	
don’t	 count	 as	 “incorrect”.	 Similarly,	 Macdonald	 (1953)	 describes	
dreams	 as	 “incorrigible”:	 “Dreams	 have	 no	 standards.	 Or,	 rather,	 it	
is	senseless	to	apply	the	notion	of	standards	to	dreams”	(Macdonald	
1953:	213).
Note	that	the	claim	that	dreams	are	alogical	does	not	rule	out	views	
according	to	which	any	experience	or	content	that	can	be	conceptually	
articulated	requires	the	possession	of	certain	inferential	abilities	—	if	I	
have	a	dream	about	a	dragon	made	of	marshmallows,	inferential	abili-
ties	may	be	implicated	in	my	possession	of	the	concepts	dragon, marsh-
mallow, constitution,	etc.	Nevertheless,	the	way	these	concepts	are	put	
together	is	not	subject	to	logical	laws	—	it	may	make	perfect	sense	in	
my	dream	that	the	dragon	is	both	wholly	composed	of	marshmallows	
and	wholly	 composed	of	dragon	flesh,	where	 these	are	different,	 al-
though	I	will	be	very	confused	on	waking.32
A	second	potential	 example	 is	 “alief”.	Gendler	 (2008b)	describes	
alief	as	“a	mental	state	that	is	…	associative,	automatic	and	arational”	
(2008b:	557).33 Alief	is	the	mental	state	which	explains	someone’s	“re-
luctance	to	eat	fudge	shaped	to	look	like	dog	feces,	to	drink	lemonade	
served	 in	a	 sterilized	bedpan,	 to	 throw	darts	at	a	picture	of	a	 loved	
one	—	even	when	she	explicitly	acknowledges	that	the	behaviors	are	
harmless”	(Gendler,	2008b:	555–556).	In	other	words,	alief	is	what	ac-
counts	for	the	“irrational”	parts	of	our	behaviour	(e. g.,	recoiling	from	
drinking	the	lemonade)	that	can’t	be	accounted	for	by	our	beliefs	(e. g.,	
that	the	bed	pan	is	perfectly	clean)	or	our	desires	(e. g.,	that	we	quite	
like	lemonade).	The	important	features	of	alief	 for	present	purposes	
(Even	without	it,	I	am	both	not	in	and	not	not	in,	which	is	still	a	contradic-
tion.)”	(Priest,	1998b:	415)
32.	Note	that	the	proposition	that	the dragon is wholly composed of marshmallows 
and wholly composed of something other than marshmallows,	 although	 contra-
dictory,	could	still	count	as	a	thought	 if	 it	counted	as	wrong,	 i. e.,	 if	 it	were	
properly	evaluable	in	light	of	the	laws	of	logic.	The	point	is	that	in	a	dream	it	
doesn’t	matter,	it	doesn’t	have	to	count	as	wrong,	and	so	it	doesn’t	count	as	a	
thought.
33.	 See	also	Gendler	(2008a).
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It	is	worth	emphasising	how	this	issue	and	the	phenomenon	I	have	
been	discussing	pull	in	two	directions.	On	the	one	hand,	we	want	to	
explain	why	logical	laws	are	so	intimately	bound	up	with	thought	and	
our	 practices	 of	 reasoning	 and	 justification.	On	 the	 other	 hand,	we	
want	 to	maintain	 that	 basic	 principles	 and	 statements	 arising	 from	
logic	are,	above	all,	true.	A	view	which	takes	laws	of	logic	to	be	consti-
tutive-normative	laws	of	thought	has	a	ready	answer	to	the	first	ques-
tion,	 but	has	no	 immediate	 answer	 to	 the	 second.	Likewise,	 a	 view	
which	 takes	 laws	of	 logic	 to	be	 connected	 to	 something	external	 to	
thought	may	have	it	easier	with	the	second	question,	but	will	struggle	
with	the	first.
A	 natural	move	 to	make,	 given	 the	Kantian	 background	 of	 this	
view	of	 logic,	 is	 the	move	 from	 acknowledging	 that	we	 can’t	 help	
but	experience	the	world	a	certain	way,	to	concluding	that	those	fea-
tures	are	thereby	genuine	features	of	the	world	we	experience.	Recall,	
in	order	for	a	thought	to	be	objectively	valid	(to	be	a	cognition),	 it	
must	conform	to	conditions	on	possible	experience	(as	well	as	being	
subject	to	logical	standards).	The	transcendental	twist	of	Kant’s	phi-
losophy	is	that	these	objectivity	conditions	are	taken	to	correspond	
to	genuine	features	in	the	world,	and	hence	to	correspond	to	truths.	
E. g.,	if	a	condition	of	a	thought	having	an	object	to	be	about	is	that	
every	object	be	spatiotemporal,	then	it	is	thereby	true	that	every	ob-
ject	is	spatiotemporal.
To	substantially	defend	a	Kantian	transcendental	move	here	would	
go	beyond	the	present	paper.	But	here	is	a	brief	sketch	of	the	idea:	The	
present	proposal	is	that	there	are	norms	evaluability	in	light	of	which	
is	 constitutive	of	 thought.	This	means	 that	any	 correct thought	 about	
anything	will	conform	to	those	logical	laws.36 It	just	won’t	be	possible	
to	have,	e. g.,	a	correct	representation	of	something	contradictory.37 As	
a	consequence	of	this,	the	only	things	we	can	think	about	correctly	are	
things	which	conform	to	the	laws	of	thought.	There	might	be	different	
36.	Whether	 or	 not	 one	 takes	 there	 to	 be	 additional	 constraints	 on	 objective	
thought,	such	as	Kant’s	conditions	on	cognition.
37.	 Assuming	that	the	law	of	non-contradiction	is	a	law	of	the	one	true	logic.
proposition.	There	may	be	other	interesting	mental	activities	and	prac-
tices	in	the	vicinity,	but	these	are	not	taken	into	account	here.	Proposi-
tional	thought	is	still	something	we	engage	in.	As	such,	an	account	of	
this	in	terms	of	constitutive-norms,	and	an	account	of	logical	necessity	
as	having	its	source	in	these	constitutive	norms,	still	has	a	place.	To	
accommodate	the	worry	by	making	the	notion	of	thought	in	play	even	
more	minimal	would	be	a	step	too	far.	E. g.,	 it	would	make	no	sense	
to	develop	an	account	of	logical	laws	out	of	an	account	of	an	activity	
which	doesn’t	obviously	have	a	relation	to	logic.	If	thought	were	taken	
to	include	streams	of	consciousness,	then	the	most	minimal	cases	of	
thought	arguably	would	not	be	logically	evaluable.
6 Objections and Replies
6.1 Truth
Statements	of	laws	of	logic	are	typically	taken	to	be	both	true	and	logi-
cally	necessary.	Logical	necessity	is	typically	taken	to	imply	truth,	i. e.,
o
L
p	⊃	p
This	is	the	T-axiom	familiar	from	modal	logic.	One	would	expect	any	
account	of	the	nature	of	logical	laws	to	be	able	to	accommodate	their	
truth,	and	also	the	validity	of	T	for	logical	necessity	(or	to	have	a	very	
good	reason	why	it	should	be	rejected).	The	alternative	explanations	
will	be	able	to	easily	accommodate	these	features.	Consider	Frege’s	
laws	of	truth:	above	all,	these	are	themselves	truths.	How things are ab-
solutely necessarily	is	also	understood	to	be	how things are.	By	contrast,	
it	is	not	clear	how	the	proposed	view,	that	laws	of	logic	are	constitu-
tive-normative	 laws	of	 thought,	 can	handle	 these	 relations	 to	 truth.	
Just	because	a	principle	is	an	inescapable	standard	of	correctness	for	
our	thought,	this	does	not	immediately	imply	that	it	is	true,	nor	that	
it	entails	truths.	But	I	take	it	that	giving	up	the	truth	of	logical	laws,	
and	the	 implication	of	 truth	by	 logical	necessity,	would	be	an	unac-
ceptable	cost.
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agency,	and	issue	(b)	can	be	addressed	by	noting	the	constitutive	tie.	
The	moral	norms	that	bind	us	do	so	because	they	are	part	of	what it is 
to	be	an	agent.39
The	intuitive	idea	can	be	put,	I	think,	rather	simply:	In	order	
to	know	what	it	takes	for	a	car	to	be	a	good	car,	we	need	
to	understand	what	cars	are,	what	their	constitutive	func-
tions	are,	and	so	on.	A	good	car	is	just	a	car	that	is	good	
as a car,	good,	that	is,	 in	measuring	up	to	the	standards	a	
commitment	 to	which	 is	built	 into	 the	very	classification	
of	an	object	as	a	car.	Analogously,	then,	perhaps	in	order	
to	know	which	actions	are	good	 (or	 right,	or	 reason	sup-
ported,	or	rational,	or	whatever),	all	we	need	is	a	better	un-
derstanding	of	what	actions	are,	or	perhaps	of	what	it	is	to	
be	an	agent,	someone	who	performs	actions.	Perhaps	the	
normative	standards	relevant	for	actions	will	fall	out	of	an	
understanding	of	what	is	constitutive	of	action	just	as	the	
normative	standards	relevant	for	cars	fall	out	of	an	under-
standing	of	what	is	constitutive	of	cars.	(Enoch,	2006:	170)
The	 analogy	with	my	 proposed	 view	 of	 logical	 laws	 is	 striking.	My	
question	 (b)	 is:	Why	 are	 logical	 laws	binding	 for	 our	 thought?	The	
proposed	answer	is:	Because	that	we	ought	to	think	that	way	is	part	of	
what it is	to	think.	My	question	(a)	is:	What	are	the	most	fundamental	
laws	of	logic?	The	proposed	answer	is:	Those	which	we	cannot	ratio-
nally	doubt,	due	to	their	being	in	some	sense	constitutive	of	thought.
So	what	is	the	problem	with	this	kind	of	view?	At	the	heart	of	the	
moral	view	is	the	idea	that	we	want	to	explain	why	it	is	good	to	do	some	
things,	such	that	we	ought	to	do	them,	and	such	that	it	is	not	an	arbi-
trary	matter	which	things	we	ought	to	do.	However,	just	because	we	
find	out	that	performing	some	actions	is	in	some	sense	constitutive	of	
being	an	agent,	why	does	this	take	away	the	worry?	Why	shouldn’t	we	
39.	Examples	 of	 constitutive	 views	 include	 Korsgaard	 (1996,	 2009)	 and	 Rosati	
(2003).
explanations	 of	 this.	 One	might	 run	 a	 transcendental	 idealist,	 con-
structivist	 story,	 and	claim	 that	 certain	 features	of	 the	world	are	 in-
jected	 into	 the	world	 through	our	cognitive	engagement	with	 it;	 in	
constructing	 a	world	 of	 experience	 in	 accordance	with	 the	 laws	 of	
thought	and	cognition,	we	 thereby	make	 it	 the	case	 that	 the	world	
conforms	to	the	laws	of	thought	(and	cognition).	Call	this	the	cookie-
cutter	view	of	the	laws	of	thought.	One	might	prefer	a	more	austere	
account,	according	to	which	things	are	as	they	are	independently	of	
our	capacity	to	think	of	and	experience	them,	but	our	capacities	de-
termine	which	parts	of	 the	world	we	are	able	 to	 think	of	and	expe-
rience.	The	things	we	can	think	of	correctly	are	real,	and	genuinely	
conform	to	the	laws	of	thought,	although	there	might	be	other	things	
lurking	beyond	our	ken.	Call	 this	 the	shape-sorter	view	of	 the	 laws	
of	thought.	In	either	case,	the	resulting	objects	of	thought	genuinely	
do	conform	to	the	laws	of	thought	—	the	laws	of	thought	are	true	of	
them	—	whether	 those	objects	be	cookies	or	 shapes.	At	 least	 in	 the	
domain	of	the	thinkable,	the	laws	of	logic	turn	out	to	be	true.	These	
kinds	of	Kantian	views	thus	demonstrate	the	start	of	a	line	of	thought	
which	can	be	used	to	argue	that	logical	principles,	evaluability	in	light	
of	which	is	constitutive	of	thought,	will	describe	genuine	features	of	
the	world,	and	therefore	be	true.38
6.2 Opting Out
Another	 potential	 problem	 arises	 by	 considering	 a	 similar	 debate	
about	moral	normativity.	In	brief,	two	issues	are	under	consideration:	
(a)	to	what	moral	standards	are	we	subject,	and	(b)	what	makes	moral	
standards	binding	for	us	—	why	ought	we	to	conform?	One	proposal	is	
that	a	constitutive	theory	can	give	us	the	answers.	The	idea	is	that	the	
moral	standard	that	one	ought	to	ϕ	is	binding	for	an	agent	because	
that	one	ought	to	ϕ	arises	out	of	constitutive	features	of	what	it	is	to	
be	an	agent,	or	because	ϕ-ing	is	constitutive	of	being	an	agent.	Issue	
(a)	can	be	addressed	by	learning	more	about	what	 is	constitutive	of	
38.	See	also	Gardner	(1999)	and	Allison	(2004)	for	more	considered	defences	of	
the	transcendental	move.
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is	also	 the	worry	 that	 the	constitutive	element	of	 the	view	 is	equally	
undermining.	Second,	just	as	we	require	a	reason	to	be	an	agent	rather	
than	a	schmagent,	so	it	seems	we	need	to	explain	why	we	should	be	
thinkers	—	subject	 to	evaluation	 in	 light	of	 the	 laws	of	 logic	—	rather	
than	schminkers,	non-thinkers	who	are	similar	to	thinkers	but	lack	the	
constitutive	feature	of	being	evaluable	in	light	of	logical	laws.
How	should	we	address	 the	charge	that	we	can	opt	out	of	being	
thinkers?	What	reason	have	we	to	be	thinkers	rather	than	schminkers?	
There	are	two	issues	here:	(1)	Is	it	genuinely	possible	for	us	to	opt	out	
of	thinking	in	this	way,	and	(2)	if	so,	what	reason	do	we	have	for	not	
thus	opting	out?41
A	simple	answer	to	(1)	is	to	point	back	to	the	arguments	for	there	
being	rationally	indubitable	logical	principles	at	all.	Surely,	if	these	ar-
guments	are	successful	 in	showing	anything,	they	show	that	we	are	
unable	to	shed	these	principles	as	standards	for	any	rational	mental	
activity	 in	which	we	engage.	So,	 it	 looks	like	we	can’t	 in	fact	choose	
to	be	schminkers,	understood	as	non-thinkers	who	are	very	similar	to	
thinkers	except	for	not	being	evaluable	in	light	of	logical	laws.	Even	so,	
this	assumes	that	we	have	a	reason	to	engage	in	rational	mental	activ-
ity:	I	have	not	been	concerned	with	the	kind	of	doubt	which	refuses	to	
“see	reason”,	which	is	just	stubborn	foot-stamping.
In	response	to	(2)	then,	we	cannot	give	up	evaluability	in	light	of	
logical	laws,	and	hence	choose	schminking	over	thinking,	on	pain	of	
losing	out	 on	 too	much.	Under	 such	 conditions,	 schminking	would	
hardly	be	similar	to	thinking	insofar	as	it	would	be	radically	irrational.	
This	is	brought	out	in	Hanna’s	response	to	a	radical	rejection	of	logic,	
which	he	calls	“white-queenism”.
By	the	notion	of	white-queenism,	then,	I	mean	the	radical	
sceptical	attempt	sincerely	and	self-consciously	to	reject	
41.	 Enoch	points	out	that	needing	a	reason	to	be	an	agent,	rather	than	a	schma-
gent,	undermines	a	naturalist	project	of	reducing	norms	for	action	down	to	
constitutive	facts	about	agents.	My	project	does	not	include	such	a	reductive	
claim	—	it	bottoms	out	in	a	certain	kind	of	norm	for	thought	—	so	I	am	not	go-
ing	to	address	this	worry	for	the	naturalist.
simply	then	worry	that	the	constitution	of	our	agency	is	just	as	arbitrary	
as	our	non-essential	desires	and	actions?	(See	Enoch,	2006:	178.)
A	variant	of	the	challenge	is	to	ask:	If	this	is	what	is	constitutive	of	
agency,	why	should	one	be	an	agent?	In	response	to	Korsgaard’s	view	
where	self-constitution	is	constitutive	of	agency,	Enoch	asks	why	the	
“agent”	cannot	simply	respond:
“…	Perhaps	I	cannot	be	classified	as	an	agent	without	aim-
ing	 to	constitute	myself.	But	why	should	 I	be	an	agent?	
Perhaps	I	can’t	act	without	aiming	at	self-constitution,	but	
why	should	I	act?	If	your	reasoning	works,	this	just	shows	
that	I	don’t	care	about	agency	and	action.	I	am	perfectly	
happy	being	a	shmagent	—	a	nonagent	who	is	very	simi-
lar	to	agents	but	who	lacks	the	aim	(constitutive	of	agency	
but	not	of	shmagency)	of	self-constitution.	I	am	perfectly	
happy	 performing	 shmactions	—	nonaction	 events	 that	
are	very	similar	to	actions	but	that	lack	the	aim	(constitu-
tive	of	actions	but	not	of	shmactions)	of	self-constitution.”	
(Enoch,	2006:	179)
Not	only	do	these	views	appear	to	fail	in	rendering	moral	norms	non-
arbitrary,	but	it	seems	that	we	are	now	able	to	opt	out	of	the	norms	
simply	 by	 saying	 we	 are	 not	 agents,	 but	 rather	 something	 similar	
which	lacks	the	relevant	constitutive	nature.
The	threat	to	my	proposed	view	is	likewise	twofold.	First,	just	as	we	
want	our	moral	norms	to	guide	us	to	the	good,	so	we	want	our	logical	
laws	to	guide	us	to	the	truth.40 However,	just	as	being	constitutive	of	
agency	doesn’t	adequately	explain	how	moral	norms	can	be	non-arbi-
trary	and	aim	at	the	good,	so	being	constitutive	of	thinking	does	not	
adequately	explain	how	normative	logical	laws	can	be	non-arbitrary	
and	aim	at	the	truth.	Not	only	is	there	the	simple	problem	sketched	
above	 that	 if	we	understand	 logical	 laws	 in	a	normative	way	we	can-
not	expect	 the	 resulting	 logical	necessities	 to	 imply	 truth,	but	 there	
40.	We	want	them	to	be	true	and/or	truth-preserving.
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matter.	They	could	not	have	beliefs,	but	instead	only	un-
reflective	attitudes.	They	could	not	give	reasons	for	any-
thing,	hence	could	not	justify	anything,	hence	would	be	
without	 cognitive	 or	 practical	 norms	 of	 any	 kind.	With-
out	 cognitive	 or	 practical	 norms,	 their	 emotional	 and	
volitional	states	would	be	without	internal	constraint	or	
structure	and	utterly	wanton,	without	any	reasons	for	car-
ing	one	way	or	the	other	about	their	direct	or	“first-order”	
desires	or	preferences.	(2006:	229)
This	seems	right.	 Judgment,	 inference,	 reasoning,	giving	reasons	 for	
beliefs	and	actions,	acting	on	the	basis	of	beliefs	and	desires,	an	inter-
est	in	truth,	and	much	more	besides	require	some	logical	standards	of	
correctness.	Perhaps	one	can	indeed	reject	logic	wholesale,	but	all	the	
rest	would	go	with	it.
Moreover,	I	have	been	understanding	thought	as	minimally	requir-
ing	entertaining	of	a	proposition.	It	can	be	argued	that	the	ability	even	
to	entertain	a	proposition	 involves	 these	kinds	of	abilities.	Different	
broad	lines	of	thought	might	be	used	to	come	to	this	conclusion.	Some	
thinkers,	including	Kant	himself,	have	argued	that	grasp	of	concepts	
and	the	propositions	they	go	to	form	requires	some	inferential	abili-
ties.	E. g.,	Baldwin	(2002)	and	Brandom	(1998,	2008)	offer	arguments	
for	the	view	that	concept	acquisition	and	deployment	involve	inferen-
tial	and	modalizing	abilities.	Alternatively,	one	might	endorse	a	theory	
of	meaning	 in	terms	of	 the	truth-conditions	of	sentences.	A	commu-
nity	which	rejected	any	interest	in	a	notion	of	truth	would	be	unable	
to	understand	propositions	the	meaning	of	which	was	constituted	by	
the	conditions	under	which	they	are	true.	So	the	logical	nihilist	would	
be	taken	to	be	rejecting	even	the	most	minimal	level	of	thought	—	en-
tertaining	of	 a	propositional	 content	—	from	many	established	philo-
sophical	standpoints.
In	short,	we	should	be	thinkers,	on	pain	of	giving	up	too	much.
logic	 completely.	 I	 will	 consider	 two	 versions	 of	 white-
queenism:	(1)	classical	or	Cartesian	white-queenism,	and	
(2)	postmodern	or	Nietzschean	white-queenism.	(Hanna,	
2006:	224)
More	interesting	is	the	second	kind	of	white-queenism.	Hanna	likens	
the	view	to	Nietzschean	scepticism	about	morality.	This	sceptic	does	
not	simply	claim	that	things	we	thought	were	good	are	in	fact	evil,	or	
that	evil	things	are	in	fact	good.	Rather,	this	sceptic	opts	out	of	moral-
ity	altogether:	there	is	no	good	and	evil.	(Note	the	similarity	here	to	
opting	out	of	being	an	agent	altogether.)
The	Carnapian-Nietzschean	or	neo-Nietzschean	 skeptic	
becomes	a	logic	skeptic	not	by	explicitly	doubting	logic,	
but	 instead	 by	 simply	 opting out	 of	 the	 social	 construct	
that	 constitutes	 the	will	 to	 truth:	 that	 is,	by	deciding	 to	
liberate	herself	 from	logic,	and	by	undertaking	 to	 live	a	
form	of	human	life	that	expresses	a	total	lack	of	concern	
for	logic.	(Hanna,	2006:	227)
I	have	argued	that	being	subject	to	some	logical	principles	is	inescap-
able	 for	human	 thought,	but	 these	arguments	all	used	 reasoning	 in	
some	way	or	another.	Why	couldn’t	we	just	side-step	the	issue	com-
pletely?	Rather	than	arguing	one	way	or	the	other	about	whether	cer-
tain	logical	principles	are	rationally	indubitable	or	similar,	one	might	
set	it	all	to	one	side	and	determine	to	go	on	subject	to	evaluation	by	no	
logical	principles	whatsoever.
Hanna’s	response	is	to	try	to	imagine	“a	community	of	fully	logic-
liberated	people”.	His	conclusion	is	that,	even	if	this	rejection	of	logic	
is	possible,	it	would	result	in	giving	up	the	ability	to	have	beliefs,	to	
give	reasons	for	action,	to	act	on	desires	and	so	on.
Inconsistency	and	fallacy	would	be	endemic,	entrenched	
among	them.	Neither	truth	nor	truthfulness	would	mean	
anything	 to	 them,	or	untruth	or	untruthfulness	 for	 that	
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sustain	a	view	whereby	there	are	several	genuine	logics	sharing	a	core	
set	of	logical	principles	but	differing	in	their	non-basic	principles.
We	must	therefore	bite	the	bullet	and	accept	that	there	is	one	privi-
leged	logic.	Exactly	which	logic	will	turn	out	to	be	the	One	True	Logic	
will	depend	upon	further	work,	to	discover	rationally	indubitable	prin-
ciples	and	thereby	to	discover	what	all	the	basic	logical	principles	are.	
That	is	a	task	for	another	time.	This	may	be	an	unwelcome	conclusion	
for	advocates	of	the	logical	systems	which	will	ultimately	be	rejected,	
or	those	who	wish	to	be	egalitarian	about	logics.	However,	there	are	
various	ways	to	sweeten	the	pill.	One	possibility	to	is	draw	a	distinc-
tion	between	a	plurality	of	logics,	which	are	formal	mathematical	sys-
tems	worthy	of	study,	and	a	single	logic	which	tells	us	the	logical	rules	
for	the	reasoning	of	rational	minds.	Mathematical	logical	systems	may	
have	many	interesting	properties	and	applications,	but	given	that	the	
very	 idea	of	 logic	has	come	out	of	 the	 study	of	 reasoning	and	valid	
forms	 thereof,	we	might	 retain	 the	 idea	 that	 the	 study	 of	 logic	 and	
logical	necessity	should	maintain	a	link	to	a	logical	system	as	a	system	
of	reasoning.	Systems	falling	short	may	be	mathematically	interesting,	
but	are	not	relevant	for	the	purposes	of	philosophical	logic.	
Another	option	might	be	to	reintroduce	considerations	to	do	with	
the	meaning	and	understanding	of	logical	constants.	E. g.,	consider	a	
logic	which	rejects	modus ponens,	but	which	claims	to	still	contain	a	con-
ditional.	I	think	it	is	open	to	argue	that,	if	a	logical	connective	doesn’t	
behave	so	as	to	validate	at	least	simple	instances	of	modus ponens,	then	
it	doesn’t	count	as	a	conditional.	After	all,	what	does	it	even	mean	to	
assert	that if p, then q,	if	this	doesn’t	mean	that	whenever	you’ve	got	p,	
you’ve	also	got	q?	If	your	conditional	is	more	complex	than	this,	such	
that	modus ponens	is	not	sufficient	for	conditional-elimination,	at	least	
it	 is	necessary.	However,	 if	 a	 logic	 claimed	 to	 contain	 a	 conditional	
which	did	not	conform	to	modus ponens	at	all,	then	rather	than	say	this	
is	not	a	“proper	logic”,	one	could	say	that	the	logic	is	misdescribed:	it	
contains	a	logical	constant	or	connective	with	various	properties,	but	
that	constant	should	not	be	counted	as	a	conditional.
6.3 Different Logics
There	are	many	well-established	logical	systems	which	differ	on	key	
principles	and	definitions,	and	on	what	counts	as	a	deductively	valid	
argument.	An	obvious	challenge	to	my	proposed	view	is	to	point	out	
that	there	are	many	different	logics	on	the	market,	all	seemingly	legiti-
mate,	which	agree	on	hardly	any	logical	principles	at	all.	Doesn’t	the	
conclusion	that	some	basic	laws	of	logic	are	rationally	indubitable	fly	
in	the	face	of	actual	logical	practice?
Even	worse,	 I	 have	 argued	 that	 the	best	 explanation	of	 this	 phe-
nomenon	is	that	the	laws	of	logic	are	constitutive-normative	laws	of	
thought:	evaluability	in	light	of	these	basic	logical	laws	is	just	what	it	
is	to	think.	But	this	threatens	to	clash	with	the	multiplicity	of	logics.	Do	
intuitionist	and	classical	logicians	have	fundamentally	different	laws	
of	thought,	such	that	the	intuitionist	is	thinking
I 
when	the	classicist	is	
thinking
C
?	If	Graham	Priest	converts	me	to	think	that	dialetheic	logic	
is	the	One	True	Logic,	do	I	change	the	constitutive-normative	laws	of	
my	thought,	and	hence	engage	in	a	different	kind	of	mental	activity,	
say	thoughtD,	to	what	I	was	doing	before?	Presumably	not.	In	which	
case,	a	story	needs	to	be	told	about	how	an	account	of	logic	in	terms	of	
constitutive-normative	 laws	of	 thought	can	accommodate	 the	appar-
ent	plurality	of	different	logics.
One	option	would	be	to	restrict	the	proposed	account	to	basic,	core	
logical	 principles.	Different	 logics	would	 then	 share	 a	 core	 of	 ratio-
nally	indubitable	logical	principles,	but	may	differ	on	less	fundamen-
tal	logical	principles.	However,	there	are	very	few	basic	principles,	if	
any,	shared	by	all	logical	systems.	Moreover,	what	should	we	then	say	
about	 the	 non-core	 principles?	Are	 they	 logically	 necessary?	 Surely	
we	want	to	say	“yes”.	But	then	they	must	either	be	rationally	 indubi-
table	—	of	the	most	basic	logical	principles	—	or	follow	logically	from	
the	most	basic	logical	principles.	We	already	know	the	non-core	prin-
ciples	are	not	basic,	so	they	must	follow	from	the	basic	principles.	But	
then	there	is	going	to	be	a	unique	set	of	(non-basic)	logical	principles	
logically	determined	by	the	basic	principles.	If	we	are	to	account	for	
non-basic	principles	being	genuinely	 logically	necessary,	we	cannot	
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7 Conclusion
In	this	paper	I	have	presented	an	argument	for	the	view	that	the	laws	
of	logic	are	laws	of	thought.	In	aid	of	this,	I	have	surveyed	several	lines	
of	argument	for	the	claim	that	there	are	logical	principles	which	are	
immune	to	rational	doubt.	If	this	is	true,	then	it	demands	explanation.	
Any	account	of	the	nature	of	logical	laws	needs	to	take	note	of	the	ines-
capability	or	rational	indubitability	of	logical	principles.	I	have	argued	
that	a	good	explanation	of	this	is	that	the	laws	of	logic	are	constitutive	
norms	of	thought.	The	view	that	what	it	is	to	think	just	is	to	engage	
in	 a	mental	 activity	which	 is	 evaluable	 in	 light	of	 certain	principles	
explains	why	we	can’t	shake	off	logic,	although	we	can	nevertheless	
make	logical	mistakes.	Finally,	I	have	considered	some	objections	to	
and	 challenges	 for	 the	 proposed	 view.	 The	 resulting	 picture	 is	 that	
there	are	norms	for	thought,	evaluability	in	light	of	which	is	constitu-
tive	of	a	mental	activity	being	thought	or	reasoning.	These	norms	are	
the	basic,	most	fundamental	laws	of	logic.42
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